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THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
AND PATTERNS OF LAND SETTLEMENT 
IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL (1882 - 1967) 
To Norah Miller, and all the men and women she represents, 
who made Israel what it is today. 
On May 15, 1948, the state of Israel came into existence in 
accordance with the United Nation's Palestinian partition reso -
lution of November, 1947. After two thousand years of Jewish 
exile and diaspora, the world had recognized and granted the Jews 
the right to claim their Biblical homeland. Establishment of the 
state by no means signified the beginning of Jewish presence in 
this Middle Eastern corner of the world since the tim e of their 
exile in 70 AD. Since the first modern major wave of Jewish immi-
gration into Palestine in the 1880s, na tional identity had been 
the goal qf idealistic pioneers, and by 1948 national ideological 
foundations, vital insti tutions, and patterns of development were 
well estab lished in the ne~ state's framework. 
Somewhere beneath ideological goals and aspirations for res-
toration of a promised homeland lie the realiti e s of building a 
mod ern nation. Israel's development had centered around three 
uniqu e and distinguishing characteristics: its hostile surrounding 
environment, its acutel y limited natural resources, and a rapidly 
increasing population. Often purel y economic considerations for 
development have had to be amended to accommodate more pressing 
social priorities of immediate employm e nt and settlement of new 
immigrants and of expanding production. 
Inherent, then, in Israel's infrastructure is this conflict 
between primarily economically rational decisions on one hand and 
social concerns on the other. The cqmbination of these two that 
Israel's policy makers have chosen as their course of development 
has shaped the Israel that exists today. Israel ' s policy of 
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rapid expansion continues and demands the most efficient use of 
all available resources of manpower, finances, and natural e ndow-
ments. The development and eventual independence of any nation al 
economy depends primarily on that economy's ability to provide 
for and progress beyond its own physical needs. Agricultural 
development plays a key role in the modernization and growth of 
any economy, but it is the transition from an agricultural to an 
industrial economy that marks a developed nation. Today, Israel 
is a modern industrial economy; in 1978 the value of agricultural 
production accounted for onty 7 % of the total GNP. The early 
structure and implementation of agricultural policies and patterns 
of development paved the way for further modern economic growth. 
The fol lowing study attempts to trace patterns of agricultur-
al development, settlements, and policies in the state of Israel, 
and to deal with the question of whether or not the most efficient 
use of all available resources for agricultural development has 
contributed to the present social and economic structure. 
Israel' s agricultural policies and plans for d evelopment are 
intimately associated with the quality and quantity of available 
resources. An inventory of potential production resources enables 
a country to get the best use from its national efforts, and aids 
in setting development priorities so as to achieve the maximum 
utilization of both current and long-range productive energies 
and efforts. A brief survey of Israel's physical characteristics 
provides the basis for a rational understanding of her agricultur-
al policy decisions. 
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Israel is a small country, presently covering 33,500 square 
miles, 5,500 of which were granted by the United Nations partition 
plan in 1947. The remaining 28,000 have been gained by milit ary 
acquisition, and include the highly controversial land of the 
west bank of the Jordan River and the Golan Heights. An old 
Jewish adage states that though Moses was the greatest of all 
Jewish prophets, his practical intelligence in choosing a homeland 
for the Jewish people left a bit to be desired. After forty years 
of wandering in the desert searching for the promised land, this 
barren spot was where he chose to settle and make the Jews! ; home. 
Indeed, the land of Israel posesses no sizable mineral resources 
nor has any significant amount of oil b een discovered on land 
presently possessed by Israel, despite the wealth of oil reserves 
in this part of the world.* An acute water shortage exists, and 
without irri~ation fuuch of th e ~~ailable ]and, particula rily the 
southern area of the Negev Desert, consisting of over half of 
Israel's total land area, is unusable for agricultural purposes. 
Longitudinally, Israel is divided into three distinct strips: 
1) The coastal plain, which is the low area of land extending 
along the Mediterranean coast from the Lebanese to Egyptian border. 
The coastal plain includes sand dunes, several rivers and streams, 
and ex tends inland to the Jezreel Valley and the northern Negev. 
This is the most densely populated part of Israel and contains the 
bulk of urban and industrial developments. 
*Oil deposits have been found in the Sinai Desert, but in 1978 
Prime Minister Menacham Begin returned the Sinai Desert to Egypt 
as part of the Camp David Peace Accord. 
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2) The mountai n range, running north to south, and broken 
between the Lower Galilee and Samarian Mountains by the fertile 
Jezreel Valley. The mountains of Samaria and Judea are one contin -
uous mass and extend north into Haifa with the Carmel Range. 
3) The Jordan Rift Valley, which consists of the land between 
the mountain ranges of Israel and Jordan, stretching north of 
th e Golan Heights t o the Gulf of Eilat in the south. 
This topography makes for thre e well-defined regions:l 
1) The northern region, including the Golan Heights, and reach-
ing from the Lebanes e and Syrian borders down to Mount Carm e l and 
to the Jordani a n border. This area contains almost half of Israe l's 
potentially usable water resources, prima r ily the Sea of Galilee 
and heads of th e Jordan River. 
2) The centr a l region, ex tending from Mount Carmel to the 
Yarkon River. 
3) The southern regions, from the Yark on River to Eilat. 
Border ed by Eqyp t and Jordan, this area is extremely arid, and 
agricultural production i s severely limited by available water 
resources. The southern Negev is sparsely inhabited, mostly by 
nomadic Bedouins, and contains the port of Eilat and government 
mineral works projects. 
Israel's climate is marked by a clear separation of a rainy 
winter season and a dry summer season. Proximity to deserts 
leads to a rapid decrease of precipitation from north to south 
and east to west, and a heavy dew occurs, particularily along the 
coast. The varying topography produces widely diversified climatic 
conditions, greatly affecting agriculture. Israel has been dividect 
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into four principal climati~ zones:2 
1) The coastal main zone, including the Jezreel Valley, with 
an annual rainfall varying from 600 mm to 150 mm (decreasing from 
north to south). 
2) The mountain zone, with a maximum of 1000 mm annual rain-
fall in the north but rapidly decreasing toward the Negev. 
3) The rift valley zone, which has extreme temperature var-
iations and a rainfall varying from 400 mm in the north to 50 mm 
in the Dead Sea area. 
4) The Negev Desert, marked by increasing aridity and de-
creasing rainfall from north to south and west to east. The 
average annual rainfall at Eilat is only 30 mm. 
Dew is an important additional form of precipitation, but 
though it is important to particular summer crops, it has little 
effect on the country's overall water balance. In most of the 
country, water is in short supply, and rainfall is unevenly dis-
tributed. Agriculture must depend on utilization o f rivers and 
underground reservoirs for irrigation which are not sufficient to 
permit irrigation of all potentially cultivable land. The most 
important agricultural lands lie in three valleys: the Coastal 
Plain, from Gaza north to the the Judean Desert, the Emek (or 
Plain of Esdraelon), extending from about nine miles east of Haifa 
through the Jezreel to Beisan and the Jordan Valley, and the 
Jordan Valley itself, from the northern limits of the Huleh Marshes 
to th e Dead Sea. Rainfall is pleasantly moderate in these areas, 
and irrigation is made expedient by the relatively close presence 
of the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan and Yarkon Rivers. The 
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Negev Desert, comprising over hal f of Isra el ' s total land area, 
is cultivab le onl y at the extremely high cost of providing irri-
gation to th e area. Sir John Hope Simpson, one of many British 
Palestinian commissioners during the Manpate, observed o f the 
Negev: 
"Given the possibility of irrigation, there is prac-
tically an in ex haustibl e supply of cultivable land .. .. 
Without irrigation, the country cannot be d evelop ed. 11 3 
In a coun try beset with demands from every sec tor for more 
resources , the cost of irrigation is a primary consideration in 
Israel's agric ul tural development. Agriculture was but on e of man y 
areas in the economy that need ed to b e rapidly developed i n Pal-
estine and that must be main ta in ed and expanded in modern Israel . 
As in an y economic und ertaking, priorities for capital investment 
had to be established , and early priori t y decisions se t the 
co urse fo r a ll futu re developments. 
Palestinian Agriculture Under Ottom an Ru le (1860-1 9 17) 
Small Jewish communities have always existed in Palest ine 
b eca u se of the Jews' spiritual tie to their Biblical ~omeland. 
For ex ample, there had been a continuous Jewish community in the 
Upper Galilee village of Pequi'in since ancient times until 1936, 
when Arab riots emptied the village of its Jewish population. 
Spanish Jews r e turned to Palestine after being expelled from Spain 
in th e fift ee nth c e ntury, and the Jewish mystic s e ct of Chassidim 
*In actuality, Palestine as an entity separate and distinct 
from greater Syria did not exist until it was created by Great 
Britain in 1917. 
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settled in Safed in the eighteenth century. In the 1850s there 
were eleven thousand Jews in Palestine, and by 1880 the number 
had increased to twenty-four thousand. 
The early Jewish Yishuv* existed ~n Palestine for reasons of 
spiritual fulfillment. The settlers believed that their presence 
and pious way of life on the holy soil would hasten the coming of 
the promised Messiah. They survived on charitable contributions 
from world Jewry and religious pilgrims to the Holy Land. The 
rabbinate, which controlled both the spiritual and secular lives 
of the Yishuv, discouraged "profane" Jewish labor as it distracted 
from more important spiritual concerns of the Jews. Self-suf-
ficiency of the Yishuv could also very well lead to a decrease in 
the charitable and sustaining funds coming from abroad.4 
As the early Jews in Palestine were relatively unconcerned 
with earthly concerns so long as they were safe, well-fed, and 
free to worship their God, the primitive semi-feudal and self-
sufficient Arab economy with sixty-five percent of its resources 
devoted to agriculture was dominant in Palestine throughout the 
nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire had ruled Palestine since 
1516. A feudal system of land ownership and peasant tenancy exis-
ted, remaining relatively unchanged until the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, when Jewish agriculture began to flourish. 
From the thirteenth through the nineteenth centuries the Arab 
fellah, or peasant, had few more rights than a medieval serf. He 
cultivated land owned by Turkish landlords and paid in kind as much 
*The term "Yishuv" applies to the Jewish community in Palestine 
until the establishment of the state of Israel. 
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as two-thirds of the crop yield to his landl or d for rent and pro-
tection from nomadic Bedouin tribes. 
In 1858 the governing Ottoman Turks did attempt land reform 
measures to improve the fellaheen's p ositio n. The Ottoman Land 
Code of 1858 was established. Land was classi fie d into fi v e 
categories: mulk, miri, wakf, metruque, and mewat. From the stand-
point of agriculture, miri land was the most important. The state 
owned the title to land classified as miri but granted perpetual 
right of its use to landholders under certain stipulated con di-
tions, of which the foremost was continu ous cultivation. Any 
land not cultivated for a period of three years automatically 
reverted back to the state. Mulk represented land held by private 
individuals; : disposable qt their will. Wakf was landed property 
dedica ted to religious purposes. Metruque was communal land used 
by the village for non-agricultural and grazing purposes . Mewat 
wa s land regarded as waste: barren sand dunes, swamps, and desert. 5 
A communal sys t em of proprietary rights had developed i n 
Pal estine known as Mesha 'a. In this system, property was held in 
common ownership by a village. Though ea ch shareholder owned a 
fractional shar e of his village's landholdings, he had no specific 
parcel of land allotted to him for c ultivation. Larg e areas of 
individual propert y shares were redistributed among family div-
isions in the village every two years. Su c h a system of common 
proprietary rights was a source of constant complaint among the 
fel laheen. In an effor t to increase private land ownership and 
control the Ottomans attempted to enforce the compulsory regis-
tration of land titles in 1860. Each fellah who wished t o with-
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draw from the communal system would receive a fixed and transfer-
able share of land. Little real registration of division of land 
was actually carried out in most villages, as the fellaheen feared 
that these measures were me~ely new ways to increase taxation and 
conscription. Thus, communal tenure persisted. All land was 
indeed registered, but in the names of a handful of Turkish 
notables who already owned property and could now increase the 
rent and taxes they collected from their tenant fellaheen.6 
The Arab fellah, who had heretofore memely reaped his crop, existed 
at a bare subsistance levct, and paid his deb ts in kind, was now 
forced to produce excess cash to pay for the land that held him 
impoverished. 
This Me sha'a system that persisted through the 1860 Land 
Reforms was widely criticized and condemned. As late as 1930 
a report of the British Government Committee on Economic Condi-
tions of Agriculturists in Palestine con si dered this sys tem to be 
the greatest obstacle to agricultural progress in Palestine. The 
report states, "This system misses the advantage alike of individ-
ualism and cooperation. While it remains, it is useless to expect 
that land will be weeded or fertilized, that trees will be planted 
or, in a word, that any development will take place.'' 
Winter cereal crops of wheat, barley and lentils were exten-
sively cultivated. Summer crops of millet, sesame, certain vege-
tabl es , and melons required deeper soils, irrigation and intense 
plowing. Because summer crops were less marketably profitable 
and more perishable much land in the summer crop area was left 
idle. Summer crops were largely regarded as in investment for 
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improving the land to bear better wi nter crops, but as each fellah 
~·orked the la nd for only two seasons, he put little effort into 
improving the land's cultivability for th e coming wi nter se ason 
en d someone else's crops. 
As money came to replace b arter as the rnediwn of exchange, 
the fel l ah 's n ee d for cash increased. His indebtedn e ss to the 
l andlord increased, for the landlord, moneylender, and graindealer 
were often one and the same. Landowners took advantage of the 
fellah ' s indebtedness, and the few fellaheen who had actually 
r egistered the land themselves wer e forced to turn their lands 
over to a landlord/moneylender as they could not adequately con-
vert their crops to cash for debt coverage. The fellah could 
not compete on the worldwide mark et and was devoting the majority 
... 
of his produce to his landlord or moneylender . His p os ition grad-
ua lly shifted from a small proprietor to a landless labor e r becom-
ing increa s ingly dependent to the labor market. 
Arab villages were largely concentrated in the safer hill y 
are as and land locat ed in the plains and on th e margins of the 
deser t was mostly uncult i vated. Under the 1860 la nd registration 
codes the Ottom a n administration in cre asingly a ssigned these un-
cu ltivated areas to private ind ividua ls, usu a ll y the Tur k ish not-
ables who were already landlord/moneylenders. Land acquisition 
i n the form of large estates became predominant. Social position 
and wealth distribution became more locked, and in short, the rich 
got richer while th e poor got poorer. 
Because of this locked system of inequalit y in land ownership 
and the actual cultivato r not receiving a "fair" return from the 
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land, Palestinian agriculture at the end of the n1neteenth century 
was marked by desolation and backwardness. In 1877 British Colonel 
c. R. Condor found the land largely empty and believed that with 
greater skills and improved technolog y the country could support 
ten times its existing population. Official British reports des-
cribed the country's condition in the early 1900s: 
"The methods of agriculture are for the most part primitive; 
the area of land now cultivated could yield a far greater 
product. There are in addition large cultivable areas 
that are left untilled. The summits and slopes of the 
hills are admirably suited to the growth of trees, but 
there are no forests .... The Jordan and Yarmuk offer an 
abundance of water power, but it is unused ... the markets 
of Palestine and the neighboring countries are supplied 
almost wholly from Europe. The seaborne commerce, such 
as it is, is loaded and discharged in the open roadsteads 
of Haifa and Jaffa; there are no harbors .... The country 
is underpopulated because of this lack of development."7 
The indigenous farme~s practiced dry farming and were largely 
self-sufficient. About fifty-two percent of the income of Arab 
farms came from cereal and grain crops. Wheat, barley, oats, 
durra, and sesame are native field crops of the area, and these, 
with the fruit cultivation of figs, dates, pomegramates, grapes, 
and olives , combined with Arab cows, sheep, and goats to cover 
practically the entire range of Palestinian Arab agriculture.8 
Arab agriculture suffered from an extreme lack of capital and 
financial resources and relied primarily on labor r eso urces. 
Farming techniques were extremely primitive, and human labor was 
use d in place of labor-saving capital devices that were developing 
elsewhere in the world. The fellah had no free working capital, 
and except for a few draft animals, a sickle, threshing board, and 
a primitive nail-plow, his only available resources for cultiva-
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tion were human. He was simply not ab l e to compete in a world-
vide agricultural system corning increasingly to enjoy the ben e fits 
of modernization. 
It is against this background that Jewish re se ttl emen t a nd 
recla mation o f Palestinian soil began in 1878. In th e lat e 1880s 
ewis h nationalism (Zionism) emerged, a nd the need for a Jewish 
r.omeland was f elt. Not any homeland, but the ancien t Jewish Bib-
lical homeland of Eretz Israel. For too long J ews had been denied 
the right to own and cultivate land in the European countr ies in 
which they had made their homes, and their economic and social 
r o les had evolved over the centuries into those of moneylender , 
s~all merchant, and tax collector. It was believed that the Jews 
co uld become a nation once again, but only by becoming self-sus-
taining on their own land . Zi on ists felt that a return to the 
s oil would restore dignity to the Jewish people and bri ng forth 
the rebirth of the Jewish natio n. The esta blishm ent of a Jewish 
s tate would b e the ultimate so l ution to the "Jewish problem", 
accord ing to Theodor Hertzl, the founder of political Zionism. 
The growth of Zioni sm among th e Jews coi ncided with the increas-
ing Jewish oppression in Tsarist Russia in th e last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. Be tween 1882 and 1903, twenty-five thousand 
J ews entered Palestine, the largest single influx of Jews since 
th e Spanish expulsion decree in 1492'. The First Aliyah* consis-
ted largely of oppressed eastern Jews, who were not motivated by 
Zionist idealism, but were intent only on freedom from religious 
pers e cution. Ninety-five percent of these new immigrants settled 
*Jewish immigration to Israel is referred to as "aliyah". It 
literally means a going up, or ascension. 
13 
in the towns. The remaining five percent were consciously 
Zionist, who attempted to establish rural communities. Harsh 
realities drastically altered their idealistic fervor. Further-
more, weak financial backing by Jewish organizations and indi-
viduals was not sufficient to insure their initial success. 
Only small tracts of land were purchased from Turkish estate 
owners, eager to profit from their landholdings somehow, in the 
Sharon Valley, east of Jaffa. The purchasing body was the 
Jewish philanthropic organization of Chovevie Zion (Lovers of 
Zion). The Jewish rural settlement of Petach Tikva and Rishon 
Lezion were established in 1878 and 1882, respectively. These 
early attempts at settlement and soil ~ultivation were a dismal 
f ai lure as malaria, hunger, floods, a lack of avail a ble markets, 
and weak financial backing forced the vast majority of prospec-
tive farmers back to the cities to make their living. 
The Zionist pioneer s did not completely abandon their set-
tl e ments and in 1884 the few remaining and struggling pioneers 
found relief in the philanthropy of Baron Edmond de Rothschild 
of the celebrated Rothschild banking dynasty. Between 1884 and 
1900 Rothschild spent six million dollars for the initial pur-
chases of land and houses, and for the continuing survival of 
new Jewish agricultural communities. Rothschild's support had 
a cost, however; under his authority Jewish agriculture became 
paternalistic. Rothschild and the foreign overseers appointed 
by him to administer his settlements made the decisions. They 
fa vored the introduction of extensive cash crop cultivation of 
citri- and viticulture, both of which required high capital in-
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vestments. Large numbers of Arab laborers were als o employed. 
The devo ti on o f all avail abl e resources to citriculture prevented 
Jewish settlements from beco ming self -sust ai ni ng. A rapidly de-
teriorating sense of morale and idealistic fervor and i ncentive 
among the pioneers accompanied th e growing dependence on Roths-
child for income dist ribu tion, investments, and furthe r land 
acquisition. Self-sufficiency was a primary Zionist ideal a s it 
was a fundament al characteristic of the new Jewish man perceiv ed 
by Hertzl. Th e need for an immediate policy change had become 
imperative. The concept of cash crops would have to be abandoned 
and replaced by the concept of farmers growing their own food if 
the settlements were ever to become self-sufficient and the Jew-
ish nation was to be rebdrn. 
Chovevei Zion was not financially strong enough, however, 
to support the twenty-two Jewish settlements an d their five 
thousand residents that ex isted in 1898, nor were the settle-
ments able to support themselves. Ver y , few of the immigrants 
were farmers by t ra de and the economic s uc cess of t he agri cul-
tural v illage did indeed depend on t he agricultural knowledge-
ability of management. Reali s tically, Ro thschild's aid was 
indi spensab l e . But after his fi rst visit to Pal e s ti ne in 1898 
to view his agricultural v en tures Rothschild r ec ognized the need 
for change in his policies. He t urned the management of the ag-
ricultural settlem en ts over to the independent Palestine Coloni-
zation Association--PICA. PICA h ad previously been engaged in 
trai ning Jews in Europe to work on the land before leaving for 
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Palestine, but its activities in Palestine were hindered by 
weak funding. The PICA introduced a more rational and diver-
sified system of farming to the Jewish settlements so that they 
might attain economic independence within a few years. Roths-
child's practice of intense, high profit citri- and viticulture 
gave way to a more varied cultivation of crops, still profitable, 
but more conducive toward the achievement of the Zionist goal 
of self-sufficiency. 
At the end of the nineteenth century PICA subsidized fifteen 
of the J e wish villages in Palestine. Complete achievement of 
Zionist goals by these settlem en ts was impeded by their ever-
increasing dependence on cheap Arab labor. In 1898 the village 
of Zichron Ya'akov, populated by two hundred Jews, employed 
ov e r one thousand Arab laborers. In Rishon Lezion thirty-eight 
Jewish families survived on the labor of over three hundred 
migrant Arab families. 9 This employment was contrary to Zionist 
goals as it placed Jews in the position of landowners and over-
seer rather than land laborer. It also denied rural employment 
to th e increasing number of Jewish immigrants ente ring Palestine. 
Their labor could not compet e with the bare subsistence wages 
being paid to the Arab laborers and the Jewish population was 
~omin~ ~ to be ·6oncentn~ted ' in the -:~rban ~areas. 
In 1901 the Jewish National Fund (JNF) was created by the 
First Zionist Congress of 1897 to buy land in Palestine with 
appropriated funds. A systematic agricultural development of the 
country began. Since the vast majority of Jewish immigrants did 
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not have the individual means with which to purchase and reclaim 
the land, the primary buyer of land in Palestine bacame the JNF. 
Land purchased by the JNF remained in title possession of the 
JNF and was leased for a period of forty-nine years to prospec-
tive Jewish settlers. Such a practice insured that individual 
Jewish farmers could not be forced to sell their land in case of 
economic hardship or sell their land for personal gain. Land 
could be subleased and transferred by inheritance only as whole 
units of transfer to further insure that land tracts would not 
be fragmented, and slowly slip from Jewish possession. Any im-
provements made on JNF land by its tenant farmer accrued to the 
tenant, as did the proceeds from his farming. The danger of 
stifled individual initiative and incentive because of socially 
owned land was therefore eradicated.lo 
Indeed, there was _li ttle chance of non-Jewish persons eve r 
regaining possession of land once it was purchased by the JNF. 
On this foundation grew the hostile accusation that Arab fella-
heen were evicted and displaced from their lands by Zionism. 
The Jewish population in Palestine had grown to nearly fifty 
thousand by 1900. Land was purchased at exorbitant rates from 
Turkish landowners, yet the majority of purchased land lay uncul-
tivated in the valley areas. Thus few fellaheen we re displaced. 
The JNF and PICA negotiated resettlement conditions with any 
Arab tenants who had been displaced by a transfer of property. 
and strongly encouraged individual Jewish buyers to do like-
wise. According to records of the Jewish Agency, in most cases 
.. - _:-, 
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the tenants were offered use of the land for six years witho ut 
charge, with the right of pre-emption after that time for the 
~ame price that the purchasing agent had bought the land. Alter-
native land tracts of 100 dunams per family were also offered, 
as was cash compensation for purchased lands. This final option 
wa s most pref e rred by the former Arab tenants, so once again the 
Jewish purchaser had to pay for land it tech n ically already 
owned. A total of 688 tenants were registered as evicted and 
displaced with both the Jewish Agency and the Birtish Government 
between the years 1878 and 1930. Yet more than two-thirds of 
these persons registered as displaced continued as farmers in 
the same regional area they ha d previously farmed. 11 As communal 
and transferrable proprietary land ownership practices had long 
been prevalent in Arab agriculture, it was not an unknown exper -
ience for the fellah to relocate his cultivation activities 
elsewhere. The ec onomic status of the fellaheen actually im-
proved with Jewish presence. Increasing numbers of settl ements 
swelled employment opportunitie~ and more advanced methods of 
cultivation introduced by Jewish farmers benefitted the tradi-
tional Arab methods. 
Though Arabs on an individual basis largely benefitted by 
Jewish presence, Arab and Turkish rulers realized the future po-
litical implications if Zionism were allowed to progress unheeded. 
Zionist pioneers would not settle for a reclamation of Arab land 
but were seeking to restore the Jewish homeland in Palestine. 
The political implications of the conflicts among Zionist, Arab, 
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Turkish, and eventually British interests in Jewish presence in 
Palestine lie outside the scope of this study, yet it must be 
stressed here that Jewish land acquisition, settlement, and de-
velopment were influenced by more than economic and social ra-
tionale. Politics has, and will continue to play a central role 
in Jewish presence and progress in the Middle East. Palestine 
in 1900 was capable of supporting a much greater population than 
its indiginous Arab popu lation. Zionism was a very real political 
threat to Arab leaders, but not a physical threat to the fellaheen. 
In 1905 renewed Jewish pogroms began in Russia and led to 
the second modern major wave of Jewish immigration, known as 
the Second Aliyah. Between 1905 and 1914 thirty thousand Jews 
entered Palestine; most of whom had socialist political leanings. 
They were devoted to the ideal of Labor Zionism, which stressed 
physical labor on Palestinian soil. The new immigrants were 
well aware of their predecessors' mistakes and realized that 
idealistic fervor alone could not overcome the harsh realities 
facing Palestinian Jewish settlement. The First Aliyah had been 
less than successful in creating the new Jewish man on Palestin-
ian soil. This was to change with the Second Aliyah. 
The radically different approach of the Second Aliyah pio-
neers was reflected through newly established JNF settlements 
and led to a completely changed outlook regarding problems of 
Jewish settlement. This changed outlook, one of agricultural 
integration together with self-sufficiency also involved a ra-
dical change in the social structure of Jewish agricultural 
villages. The JNF required that its lands be distributed in an 
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amount such that each farmer was able to work the land by his 
own effor ts and those of his family. He could thereby eventually 
become dependent only on himself. The need for hired labor was 
to be abolished. The concept emerged of basing th e whole social 
structure of a village on personal labor, dividing the land so 
that no man would need hired help, but would be able to perform 
all the tasks on the land himself. Patterns of Jewish agricul-
tural settlemen t established during the Second Aliyah period set 
the foundations for agricultural settlement as it exists today. 
Though individual farmers and PICA continued to buy land from 
Arab and Turkish landowners, it was the World Zionist Organi-
za tion and JNF whose policies largely dictated the pattern of 
t he ensuing development. These policies were most influenced 
by the first director of the Palestinian Office of the Jewish 
National Fund, Dr. Arthur Ruppin. Ruppin was a true Zionist, 
but he was also a realist. He realized that the Yishuv was not 
ready for an autonomo us existence within the Turkish Empire in 
Palestine at the opening of the twentieth cen tury. Hertzl's 
vision of a Jewish state could be achieved only after the Jewish 
population formed a much greater proportion of the total popu-
lation and owned s ubstantially greater amounts of land in Pales-
ti ne. He recognized that the immediate need was to create em-
ployment for the thousands of new Jewish immigrants arriving in 
the country. Thus massive land acquisition by the JNF as funds 
through worldwide philanthropy became available was a top pri-
orit y. 12 As most pioneers of the Second Aliyah were strongly 
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influenced by socialist leaning~ they perceived that the best 
way of settling the land, integrating new immigrants, and achiev-
ing economic self-sufficiency (thereby avoiding the exploita-
tion of hired Arab labor) to be through the establishment of 
collective communal settlements. Settlers of communal enter -
prises would constitute a single large work force, enabling the 
available land to be most efficiently cultivated. Economies of 
scale denied to small agricultural production units could be 
realized by large-scale communal enterprises. 
Backed by Dr. Ruppin, Russian Jews founded the first com-
munal agricultural settlement of Degania on twelve hundred du-
nams of land near the Sea of Galilee in 1909. Supplied by the 
JNF with land, livestock, equipment, and seed advanced against 
fu t ure earnings, the settlers struggled to establish a community 
based on socialist ideals. There w~s to be no hired labor and 
all work and proceeds were to be shared collectively by the set-
tlers. They succeeded in their venture and by 1914 there were 
fourteen kibbutzim* established by the JNF . Though initial re-
turns were not high, kibbutzim integrated new settlers from a ll 
walks of life into their new life in Palestine and trained them 
to work on the soil. And after a few harvests the settlements 
attained a fair degree of self-sufficiency. 
To achieve the primary Zionist goal of self-sufficiency, 
JNF and PICA agricultural policies and patterns of cultivation 
leaned further away from fruit and vine plantations and inten-
*The Hebrew word for a communistic collective settlement is 
kibbutz; its plural is kibbutzim. 
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sified on mixed and diversified farms. Both available land and 
labor were limited and the maximum returns from each unit of 
labor and land input was imperative if agricultural production 
and returns were to be maximized. The pattern of mixed farming 
best suited the dual purposes of providing a degree of self-
sufficiency and full employment. Relying on intensive cultiva-
tion and irrigation, production was based on fruit orchards 
and grain and vegetable farming branches to maintain a balanced 
labor schedule. Dairy and poultry production branches provided 
the necessary cash turnover. Such a balanced system of farming 
strengthened the settlers' security, led to a reduction in the 
size of a farm necessary to provide an adequate income, and 
enabled the maximum returns to be reaped from the land. 
Kibbutzim and communal living appealed to settlers with 
complete socialist and egalitarian ideals of collective pro-
duction, distribution, and consumption of goods. The communal 
principle applied to all aspects of life. Members ate together 
in a central dining room, children were cared for and slept in 
childrens' houses, leaving the parents free to perform their 
required tasks and to enjoy their children completely in their 
non-working hours. The basic necessities of shelter and cloth-
ing were provided by the kibbutz for all its members. Members 
shared equally in work details, group decisions, and community 
responsibilities. Such practices were fundamental tenets in 
early kibbutz ideology and remain in practice, though somewhat 
modified, today. 
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Betw een 1880 and 1914 over sixty thou sand Jews 
enter ed Palestine, mostly from Russ ia, Galicia, 
Rumania and Poland . The victi ms of persecution 
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and a new security under Turkish rule. Many 
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mar sh, whi ch they then drained , irrigated and farmed 
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Jew ish town, Tel Aviv, on the sandhills north of 
Jaff a. The Jews purchased their land piecemeal, 
from European, Turkish and (principally) 
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World War I and the British Mandate (1914-1948) 
By 1914 there were forty-four Jewish villages, including 
kibbutzim, in Palestine and a Jewish rural population of nearly 
twelve thousand. Most villages were based on mixed farming and 
were producing citrus, tobacco, grapes, vegetables, poultry and 
dairy products. European markets were expanding and agricultural 
surpluses, primarily citrus fruits and wine, were being exported. 
Many Jewish immigrants desiring to work the land, yet not enam-
ored with the communal lifest y le of the kibbutz found employ-
ment in citrus groves and earned the bulk of their annual income 
during the harvest season. 
By far the greatest impact of World War I on Palestine and 
its Jewish community was th e introduction of British presence 
in the Middle East, replacing the now destroyed Turkish Ottoman 
Empire. On November 2, 1917, the British Foreign Secretary, 
Arthur J. Balfour, sent a letter to Lord Rothschild, declaring 
British support for a Jewish homeland. The position of the 
British government" ... favored the establishment in Palestine 
of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their 
best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it 
being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may 
prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine. 11 13 The conception of early 
pro-Zionist British leaders was that the Mandatory Government 
be established to better social and economic conditions in Pal-
estine. Because the Zionists were specifically agriculturally-
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inclined , the Mandatory was instructed to facilitate agricultural 
development.and c lo se settlement on the land. 14 
World War I had cut Pal est i ne off fro m her western European 
markets, and citrus groves and vineyards suffered a greater 
blow as a result of the lo st export market than those a gri cu l-
tur a l communities based on mixed farming. Both private and 
communal farms did survive the harsh conditions i mpos ed by the 
war , however. The few immigrants possessing the personal means 
wit h which to revive the citrus and wine industries purchased 
groves and deve loped plantations . 
But most new immigrants did no t have the personal funds 
with which to purchase and develop the land. They relied on the 
JNF for financial aid in the establishment of their new homes. 
These immigrants, though Zionists and inflamed with the desire 
to cultivate the land , were not a lt ogether attr ac ted to the so-
cia list id eals and commun a l lifes t yle of the kibbutz. Th ey com-
bined with unemployed citrus workers to cal l for a form of set-
tlement more adequately suited to worker motivatio n of personal 
gain. In 1920 the JNF, backed by worldwide Zionists, created a 
foundation fund (Ke ren Hayesod) for t he express purpose of fi-
nancing J ewis h settle ment on land purchased by the J NF . The 
ma jor objective of th e new fund was to cr ea te new agricultural 
s e ttlement s to accommodate and attract both communal and non-
communal mind ed pioneers . Thus, the second form of settlement 
unique to Zionist agriculture was born: the moshav ovdim.* 
*The Hebrew phrase for workers' cooperative smallholding set-
tlement is moshav ovd im, commonly referred to only as moshav. 
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The first major undertaking of Keren Hayeson occurred in 
1921 with the develo pment and settlement of n ewly purchased land 
in the Jezreel Valley. The land was virtually unpopulated and 
largely co vered by malaria-infested swamps. Because of the size 
of tirr~ purchased land tract, development of the Jezreel req uir ed 
that agricultural settlements be integrated on a regional scale 
rather than following previous schemes of scattered settlemen ts.1 5 ' 
The membership of an individual kibbutz numbered from fifty to 
two hundred working members (children excluded) in the early 
1920s. Kibbutzim en joy ed economies of scale when compared to 
individual family farm production units, but regional cooperation 
among relatively large-scale production units could enjoy even 
greater benefits of scale. In 1921 , under the direction of Dr. 
Ruppin, the village of Nahalal , the first moshav ovdim was 
founded. Th e moshav received its land from the JNF and divided 
it in such a way that each member family had an area of land 
t hat it could c ul tivate by itself . The initial clearing o f the 
land was done col l ective ly, af te r which each family lived on and 
farme d its own plot in div idually. The moshav continu e d to e n-
gage in cooperative buying and se lling, including the purchas e 
a nd op era tion of heav y farm equipment and the market distribu-
tion of its agricultural produce. Production, consumption, and 
personal decisions wer e made by the individual family, contrast-
ing with the all-encomp as sing communal decisions on kibbutzim. 
The rnoshav concept developed into a s e ries of family farms, 
int e grated into cooperative vil lages. Famil y membership usually 
consisted of about e ight y to one hundred families. \ The land area 
~-, 
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of each farm in a moshav tended to be approximately the same in 
each moshav, and averaged just over forty-five dunarns (11.2 acres) 
per family. 16 These farms engaged in mixed farming; milk, eggs, 
fruit and vegetables were produced individually and marketed 
cooperatively. The smallholdings were organized for large-scale 
cooperative functions in order for each farmer to maintain his 
economic competitiveness. Benefits of scale at the marketplace 
were enjoyed by the farmer while he maintain ed the independence 
of individual production decisions. The basic resources for 
moshav farmers, i.e. land, water, houses, outbuildings, eq uip-
ment, and working capital, were distributed on an equal basis 
by the JNF, but unlike the kibbutz the moshav allowed a different 
economic status to its members which was dependent on the per-
sonal decisions of further investment and work by each moshav 
farmer. 
The moshav experiment succeeded in reclaiming the land on 
a regional scale. Newly established moshavim joined with both 
new and already established kibbutzim to transform the Jezreel 
Valley (Vall ey of Esdraelon) into fertile farmland. The Report 
of the High Commissioner on the Administration of Palestine 
recorded in 1925: 
ttThe most striking result has been achieved during 
the last few years in the Valley of Esdraelon. This is 
a belt of lush, deep soil which stretches for forty 
miles from the sea at the Bay of Acre eastwards down 
into the Jordan Valley; it is some nine miles broad, 
between the range of Mount Carmel and the hills of 
Samaria in the south, and the hills of Galilee about 
Nazareth and Mount Tabor in the north. When I first 
saw it in 1920, it was a desolation. Four or five 
small and squalid Arab villages, long distances apart 
. ) 
from one another, could be seen on the summits of low 
hills here and there. For the rest , the country was 
uninhabited. There was not a house, not a tree .... 
A great part of the soil was in the ownership of absen-
tee Syrian landowners. The river Kishon, which flows 
through the valley and the many springs which feed it 
from the hillsides, had been allowed to form a series 
of swamps and marshes, and, as a consequence, the coun-
try was infested with malaria. Besides, public secur-
ity had been so bad under the former regime that any 
settled agriculture was in any case almost impossible . . 
"By an expe nditur e of nearly 900,000 pounds, about 
51 square miles of the valley have been purchased by 
the Jewish National Fund ... 20 villages have been founded, 
with a population numbering at present above 2600; 
nearly 3000 dunams (about 700 acres) have been affores-
ted .... All the swamps and marshes within the area that 
has been colonized have been drained, and cases of 
malaria are proportionately rare. An active trade in 
dairy produce has sprung up mostly finding a market ... 
in Haifa. The whole aspect of the valley has changed. 
The wooden huts of the villag e s, gradually giving place 
to red-roofed cottages, are dotted along the slopes; 
the plantations of rapidly-growing eucalyptus trees 
already begin to give a new character to the landscape; 
in the spring the fields of vegetables or of cereals 
cover many miles of the land, and what five years ago 
was little better than a wilderness is being trans-
formed before our eyes into a smiling countryside. 11 17 
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By and large, the coop e rative farms proved to be as success-
ful as the communal farms. Moshav members were less interested 
in absorbing untrained immigrants than were kibbutzim and as a 
result their turnover and overall population was less than that 
of the communal settlements. In 1931 kibbutz membership totalled 
4A00 and moshavim had a total population of 3J00. In 1936, re-
spective memberships totalled 16,400 and 9 ,ooo.18 Both patterns 
of settleme nt served their dual economic and social purposes 
well. They provided employment for the influx of new Jewish 
immigrants constantly arriving in Palestine, filling the needs 
of both capitalist and socialist persons. They were striving to 
become ec onomically self-sufficient enterprises, following the 
Zionist ideal of abstaining from employing Arab labor. 
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;-Controversy existed around claims of social and economic 
superiority between the kibbutzim and moshavim. The coopera-
tive use and joint ownership of large machines by the cooper-
ative caused capital costs to be no higher in cooperatives than 
in communes. The only obvious case of higher costs in the mo-
shav was in housing where the higher cooperative expenditure 
reflected a higher standard of housing accomodations and the 
higher cost of building many separate and small units. In an 
economic study of cooperative and communal settlements in Pal-
estine, the economic historian Robert Nathan concluded that 
the cooperative farm unit (a unit being measured as a man, wife, 
and average number of children, with adult unma rried persons 
included in the averaging) was able to supply four hundred an-
nual man-days of productive work, while relatively mature com-
munal farms achieved an average of only three hundred and twenty.19 
Nathan concluded that the higher average productivity of the 
cooperative reflected the greater frequency with which women in 
a moshav worked in the fields as well as cared for children and 
kept their house. Longer hou rs were often worked on the moshav, 
and the representative cooperative farmer was older and more 
experienced than the communal farmer. The moshav farmer was 
also motivated by greater material personal gains for added work, 
whereas worker motivation on the kibbutz was primarily ideolo-
gical. 
Other forms of settlement developed, but on a much smaller 
scale. The first moshav shitufi (collective village) was founded 
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in 1936 and combined some of the economic aspects of the kibbutz 
with so me of the social aspects of the moshav. Farm operation, 
economic decisions, and profits were shared equally and under 
one management as on a kibbutz, but individual family life was 
conducted as in a moshav; children lived with their parents in 
their own home. The moshav shitufi never evolved into a major 
form of settlement primarily because of the clash in individual 
and communal interests inherent in its structure. 
Rural villages based on private land ownership and indivi-
dual farming (moshavot) also continued to expand in the early 
twentieth century. The value of citrus products and grape wines 
produced by these capitalist farms exceeded that of the moshav-
im and kibbutzim combined. By the 1930s citrus crops were Pal-
estine's major agricultural export. But in both real and rel-
ative terms, the population, landholdings, and political influence 
of communal and cooperative settlements surpassed that of private 
farms. Not only were these Zionist settlements by and large 
economically self-sufficient and e ventuall y profitable ventures, 
but they fulfilled the l arger social aims of social integration 
and immediate employment of new immigrants on Palestinian soil. 
Patterns of settlement and integration of new immigrants 
by the World Zionist Organization are unique in agricultural 
development throughout the world. Economic concerns were often 
secondary to more pressing social needs. In the words of Dr. 
Ruppin: "First, success depends on a natural and organic selec-
tion of men. Secondly, on a number of men whose common aims and 
interests infuse a spirit and soul into the settlement .... The 
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success or failure of settlement depends much less on the find-
ing of a suitable system of society for rural settlement than 
on the finding of a system of agriculture which appeal s to the 
mentality of the immigrant, which is desirable from a national 
point of view and which will pay its way. 1120 
Though Jewish agricultural settlements were firmly estab-
lished on Palestinian soil by the early 1920~ the next twenty 
years were not easy ones. The inherent conflict between social 
and economic goals in Zionist ideology regarding land recla-
mat io n became an acute reality facing problems in the practical 
application of those goals. ·Conflidt~ arose between Arab, Jew-
ish, and British interests co ncerning optimum land settlement 
and dev e lopment, centering largely around political issues. 
Palestini an agric ultur al development and land settlement must 
be understood within the context of the political climate of 
Palestine. Political concerns had played a primary role in Jew-
ish land purchases and settlement ever sinc e their beginning 
under Ottoman rule. But during the British Mandate, politics, 
under the guise of "econ omic a bsorptiv e capacity'' was at the 
forefront and almost strangled Jewish settlement in Palestine. 
The Brit ish government strangled Jewish settlement in two areas: 
immigration and land acquisition. British polici e s which evol-
ved to restrict Jewish immigration into Palestine were a total 
antithesis of avowed British support of a Jewish state and were 
the result of political pressures wrought by Arabs who opposed 
the development of a Jewish homeland in what they already felt 
t o be their homeland. The central conflict between Arab, British, 
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and Jewish interests concerning Palestinian agricultural devel-
op ment and land settlement throughout the Mandate period revolved 
around the issue of precisely how many peole the land, dunam by 
dunarn, could support. 
Eco nomi c absorptive capacity is not a static concep t but is 
co nstantly changing as methods of production and technology change. 
Just as ther e was no decisive way to measure the exte nt of future 
t echn olo gic al changes, there was no decisive way to measure the 
extent by which the Palestinian ec onom y would expand by such 
fu t ure changes to provide ample employment, food production, and 
se tt lement opportunities for an expanding population. In 1930 
the official British Report by the British Commissioner of Pal-
est inian Affairs, Sir John Hope Simpson, accepted the conclusions 
o f Dr. A. Strahorn, who had been a member of the Joint Pales-
tine Survey Commission, regarding land use possibilities i n Pal-
es t ine. Dr. Strahorn and his associates concluded th at 6,544 ,000 
d un ams were a v ailable for sett l emen t in 1927, 4 ,055,002 of which 
were cultivable. In 19 30 724,8 40 dunams were owned by the JNF 
and PICA, which included sixteen percent of the area ca tegorized 
as cultivable. 21 Though Jewish agencies and in div id uals were 
buying land wherever and whenever th ey were ab le, from 19 1 9 to 
1944 the y acquired only about six percent of Palestine's total 
26,000,000 dunarns; about 1,560,000 dunams (400,000 acres). Most 
of this land was covered with swamps, rocks or sand and was un-
cultivated at the time of its purchase. Les s than one-fourth of 
the lands purchased had ever been cultivated by the Arabs. 22 
B~sides restrictiv e British polic y , there we re two major 
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obstacles facing Jewish agriculture in Palestine i n the early 
1900's, which remain a factor today. The first is the basic 
infertility of much of the soil without irrigation. The cost 
o f irrigation was prohibitively high in many instanc es for Jew-
i sh buyers because the initial land purchas e and continuing 
cost of support for the settlements were so high. Much of the 
farming was limited to intensive cultivation and dry farming. 
The second problem concerned limited markets for agricultural 
produce. Farmers' produce was a seasonal commodity, and the 
lack of an e fficient marketing system in Pal e stine's early 
years led to crop spoilage and market gluts and shortages. But 
Jewish time and energies could only be devoted toward improving 
market conditions after their agricultural settlements were 
secure and self-sufficient. 
Cultivability, like economic absorptive capacity, is not 
an unchanging and undisputable measurement, but changes as tech-
nology and other economic factors change. The attitude of the 
JNF toward a land's cultivability is expr ess ed in the words of 
Dr. Maurice Hexter, a spo kesman for the Jewish Agenoy, who de-
fended th e Zionist view to the British Government in 1937: 
"Th e word 'cultivable' does not describe an in-
herent or absolute attribute of land, which determines 
the use to which i t can be put. Cultivability is not 
the independent d e termining factor, but is itself de-
termined by the interaction of the physical properties 
of the land (including availability of irrigation waters) 
and the economic factors of production which are applied 
to it and modify it. To what extent factors of pro-
duction can be applied depends on the e conomic progress 
of the country as a whole, including the possibilities 
of special products, and can only be forecast from time 
to time. Land will be taken into culti v ation or sub-
jected to a more intensive or different form of cul-
tivation as and when the supply of capital, labor, 
ski _ll and available mark ets warrant it." 2 3 
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The determination of a land's cultivability is dependent 
on technological and economic conditions at a given time. The 
land in Palestine considered to be cultivable by the British 
government with existing methods of cultiv ation throughout the 
1930s consisted of four primary areas: 
1) The Maritime, or Coastal Plain, 
2) The Esdraelon Plain, or Emek, 
3) The Jordan Valley, 
4) The hilly areas. 
The Beersheva and Negev regions were excluded from the possibili ty 
of profitable cultivation because of the unavailability of irri-
gation water at that time. Without irrigation, these southern 
regions were desert, capable of supporting only a few nomadic 
Bedoins. Th e cultivable areas were thus classified not because 
of their inherent ease of cultivation ; on the contrary, they 
were primarily swampy, sandy, or alkaline. Only with large in-
vestments of money, time, and energy could these areas be made 
suitable for settlement. 
The Maritime Plain. The Maritime Plain contained ten Jew-
ish settlements in 1919, with 5 ,850 Jews holding 115,700 dunams 
of land. By 1930 the number of settlements had increased to 
thirty-two, and the area was populated by 25,669 Jews on 274,850 
dunams of land. 24 The sandy soil of this area was best suited 
to citrus cultivation. Most of the settlements were private 
villages established by PICA funds. Before the villages could 
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actually be built, the land had to be drained of its malaria-
infested swamps. The majority of the initial investment in this 
area was devoted toward swamp drainage and irrigation. The 
total amount of capital invested in the Maritime Plain from 
1920 to 1930 was approximately five million British pounds, 
provided solely by worldwide Jewish organizations. 2 5 A British 
Palestine Survey Report s _ubmi tted in 19 30 described the influence 
of a decade of Jewish presence in the Maritime district: 
"The squalid villages of the natives are ceasing 
to dominate the landscape in the presence of the newly-
built villages of the immigrant colonies; modern farm 
equipment is taking its place beside the nail plough 
and the ancient threshing floor; field crops new to 
Palestine are being introduced; vineyards and almond 
groves are being extended, along with the planting 
of some deciduous orchards; bananas and other specialty 
crops are being tried out; winter vegetables are being 
grown for export ... as improved marketing methods make 
that possible. In short, really modern agriculture 
is being undertaken in Palestine . 11 26 
Grains and vegetable crops were generally grown by each 
farm e r for his own use, and these villages specialized in citrus 
cultivation. They were depen de nt on the citrus as their pri-
mary source of income. Pale stine's greatest commercial agricul-
tural enterprise throughout the Mandate remained its citriculture. 
From 1918 to 1937 the total area under citrus increased from 
30,000 dunams to 299,500 dunams. 27 These groves were made more 
profitable as the trees were planted extremely densely.* Such 
density was allowed because human labor rather than bulkier mach-
*Citrus groves in Palestine were planted with 240-320 trees per 
acre, compared to 60-100 trees per acre in the United States. 
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inery was used to nurture and gather the harvest . 
The greatest factor prohibiting full development of the 
Maritime Plain during the Mandate period was the unavailability 
of adequate irrigation water to support Jewish proposals of 
increased and intensified settlements. The Kishon and Auja Rivers 
combined with the numerous springs in the area as potential 
sources for irrigation, but pumping underground water resources 
to irrigate the land would be essential for further development. 
Existing methods of sinking wells were inadequate for further 
underground water exploitation and the cost of modern electrical 
techniques of pumping the water was prohibitively high and its 
returns too uncertain to allow the cultivated area to increase. 
Development of the Maritime Plain during the Mandate was then, 
by no means compl e te, but its citrus cultivation did account for 
the Jews' most profitable venture on the export market. 
The Esdraelon Plain. The soil of the Esdraelon Plain was 
ill-suited to citrus cultivation, and more suited for the culti-
vatio n of cereal crops. The Nuri s Springs were the primary source 
of irrigation water for this area. The availability of this 
water throughout the Esdraelon was sharply limite d, however, and 
int ens ive dry farming was therefore practiced. Jewish financial 
investments for reclamation of the Esdraelon were directed pri-
marily toward swamp drainage, digging irrigation canals, and rock 
removal. A repor t submitted to the Jewish Agency describes what 
the Jewish settlers fac ed in the Esdraelon Plain: 
~ 
"Th e drainage work of Nahalal and Nuris is the 
most important undertaking of its kind in Palestine. 
Both areas were extremely malarious. In both areas 
there are remains of villages which were apparently 
wiped out by malaria. All the new settlements were 
exposed to this scourge, and if drainage operations 
had not been undertaken immediately they would have 
been doomed to failure. As a result, however, of 
the drainage works undertaken, these places are being 
made habitable and healthy. 11 28 
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In 1919 there was one Jewish settlement in the Esdraelon 
Plain; Kibbutz Merhavia. Eleven years later, in 1930 there were 
thirty-one settlements with 5,679 inhabitants on 157,416 dunams 
of land. These settlements were kibbutzim and moshavim, and 
practiced mixed farming me thods. The settlers introduced dairy 
farming to the area and imported pure-bred sires from northern 
Europe. A well-integrated system of mixed farming was developed 
and nurtured in the Jewish settlementi of the Esdraelon. Modern 
methods of crop rotation, cultivating new crops such as flax, 
clover, alfalfa, and importing livestock were direct results 
of this new system of cultivating a farm's total produce. Fod-
der was grown, not for sale, but to be converted into milk, meat, 
eggs, and poultry. Surplus grain was sold, but the main income-
returning produce for sale were milk, eggs, and poultry. 
Coop erative and communal settlements predominated in the 
Esdraelon Plain, and continue to do so today. Once again, how-
ever, it was the opinion of the British government that the 
existing supply of irrigation water was not sufficient for further 
cultivation and settlement of the land in this area of Palestine 
and that any further Jewish settlement should take place on land 
already owned, but presently unsettled and held in reserve by 
the JNF as of 1930. 
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The Jordan Valley. The Jordan Valley consists(,bf1 ltr.hei,µpper 
Huleh and Beisan Plains and the lower Jordan Valley around Jer-
icho. The soil of the two upper plains was very fertile, and with 
irrigation, w:a.0::r suitable for fruit and vegetable cul ti va tion. 
It was largely limited to dry farming cereal and forage crops 
throughout the early 1930s, however. The upper area of the 
Huleh Plain was a potential goldmine but was unusable because of 
the swamp and marsh conditions of the land. The Palestine Survey 
Commission reported: 
"The largest and most potentially valuable body 
of agricultural land in Palestine is ... in the basin 
of Lake Huleh, which drainage would make available 
for irrigation farming. The marginal lands are of 
exceptional fertility ... this land, if reclaimed, 
would have advantages found only in equal measure 
in the best part of the Coastal Plain. The resulting 
influence on the population and the wealth of Pal-
estine would be very marked. 11 29 
Realization of the land's great potential hinged on the 
tapping of Lake Huleh's vast water resources by the establish-
ment of a hydro-electric plant, yet none existed in 1930. Land 
covered by malaria-infested swamps in the Huleh and Beisan Plains 
was suitable for the cultivation of sugar-cane, oranges, bananas, 
date palms, figs, olives, and grapes, but the prohibitively high 
cost of irrigation and swamp drainage prevented extensive Jewish 
reclamation and settlement of the Huleh district through the 
early 1930s. 
The lower Jordan Valley contained naturally fertile soil, 
but its fertility was marred by its high alkaline content. Until 
sufficient funds could be found to finance the task of washing 
the soil free of its high salt concentration, Jewish settlement 
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would not be feasible in the low er Jordan Valle y. Jewish colo-
nies in the Jordan Vall ey , including the first kibbutz, Degania, 
were located on th e southern shore of the Sea of Galil ee and 
engaged in some irrigated and dry farming, with special attention 
to the cultivation of early vegetables.30 The rest of the Jordan 
Valley was widely used by the Bedoin for pasture for their flocks. 
Hill Country. Finally, the hilly country was available for 
cultivation, but its potential use was extremely limited by the 
lack of irrigation water. As a rule, water in the hill country 
was available only for domestic and stock uses, and even then, 
was often in short supply. The cultivation that did exist was 
limited to summer sesame and olive trees. The British High 
Commissioner reported on the hill country: 
" ... if capital were available, many of the cul-
tivators of ... exiguous and infe rtile plot s would be 
able to gain a liv e lihood by cultivation of fruit 
trees and of olives. These c ultivator s have, however, 
no capital, and cannot aff ord to for ego even the 
meagre crops obtained for the four or five years 
which are required be fore fruit trees render a re-
turn .... From the point of view of agriculture; th e 
hill country will always re main an unsatisfactor y 
proposition. 11 31 
Despite extremely l i mited irrigation pract ices and restric-
ti ve British policies, Jewi sh labor and capital had transfo r med 
the Palestinian countryside from a desolate wasteland into fer-
tile soil for profitable crop cultivation. Hand in hand with 
the high purchase cost of th e land borne by Jewish purchas e rs 
was the e qually high cost of soil ameliorization. Land amel-
iorization in the hill s meant removing large boulders, clearing 
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the ground of weeds and bushes, and terracing. In the sand 
dune areas it meant levelling, securing the dunes by planting 
pine and castor oil trees as windbreaks, and adding organic and 
other fertilizers to the soil. In the swamp areas it meant 
damming water sources, digging irrigation canals, and planting 
eucalyptus trees. The huge roots of these trees drank in much 
of the water that lay stagnant on the land. In saline soils, 
it meant leaching the soil until the poisonous salts had been 
washed away by the process.* Wells had to be sunk, and elec-
tricity for power and lights had to be provided before an area 
could be settled. 
The economic future of Palestinian agriculture lay restricted 
in its irrigated plains. Irrigation is the single most vital 
prer e quisite for profitable soil cultivation and agricultural 
development in this part of the world. The primary problem of 
water for irrigation in Palestine was not that it did not exist, 
but that its sources were sorely maldistributed. The Jordan 
and Yarkon Rivers were located in the central portion of the 
country. An abundance of streams and springs existed near the 
source of the Jordan River from the Sea of Gal ilee, in the 
Beisan Plain, and Jordan Valley; all in the northern portion of 
the country. Water was also obtained from wadis (normally dry 
water courses which fill during overflow or floods) and from 
underground sources. 
*Leaching is a process by which the land is sectioned and par-
titioned to be methodically flooded and drained. 
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These underground water sources were the main source of 
irrigation. In 1935 ther e were from 2,500 to 3,000 wells tapped 
into water reserv es. In 1946 a little over 40 0,000 dunams of 
land, l ocated primarily in the Maritime Plain, were under irri-
gation. These 400,000 dunams represented only a litt l e over 
one-eighth of the 2,964,000 dunams classified as irrigable by 
the Joint Palestine Survey Commission in 1926, and used less 
than ten percent of the total amount of available water. Most 
irrigated land was under citrus cultivation. In the non-citrus 
areas of irrigated Jewish lands- (mostly vegetable farming) wells 
accou nted for seventy percent of the water used for irrigation, 
fifteen percent was irrigated by river pumping, and fifteen 
percent was irrigated by springs. 32 
Palestine's limited irrigation caused by its maldistribu-
tion of water sources was amplified by the absence of any inte-
grated irrigation practices throughout the 1940s. Since the 
J ewis h Agency was no t a governmental agency , it l acke d the re-
sources and authority to integrate irrigation. As a result 
ea ch settlement attempted to provide itself with irrigation 
waters . A spo radic, costly and wasteful search for water resulted. 
To solve th is problem, water supply cooperatives were formed by 
neighboring settlements. The Jewish Agency formed the Merakoth 
Water Company, which gained considerable authority and which 
developed an integrated irrigation system after 1948, when the 
state of Isra el was e stablished, but th e necessary capital and 
te chnological knowhow for full exploitation of Palestine's water 
resources did not exist through the 1940s. Experiments to 
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increase benefits from irrigation included the damming of wadis 
and soil desalinization. The most costly and productive under-
taking of this sort occurred just north of the Dead Sea at Beit 
Haarva in 1941, where small stretches of saline soil were desal-
inated through flood waters from the Jordan. For six months 
the soil was rinsed until chemical analysis showed that most 
of the salts had been washed to levels harmless to plant growth. 
The desalinated soil proved to be as productive as the non-
saline soils of the fertile upper Jordan Valley. 33 But despite 
succes se~ in irrigation experiments such as this, water exploi-
tation was drastically limited because of the prohibitively 
high cost of transporting the water to where it was most needed. 
The great er half of land available for cultivation in Palestine 
lay in the desert regions of the Negev, but until the desert 
could be irrig at ed, it was forced to remain barren. 
Again, i t is essential to remember the central role that 
politics played in determining how the Jews were allowed to 
settle th e land. The British were committed both to aiding the 
Jews in establishing a homeland and preserving Arab rights in 
their same homeland. The greater Arab world was a constant 
threat to Britain's security in the Middle East so long as her 
committment to the Jews was a first priority. In 1939 the Man-
datory Government enacted a series of restrictive land transfer 
regulations whereby Jewish purchases could be controlled in 
order to somewhat appease the Arabs. 
Palestine was divided into three zones. A free zone con-
tained th e industrial areas of Haifa and Tel Aviv and the central 
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part of the coastal plain, and covere d 1,334,000 d una ms, or 
five percent o f the total land area of Palestine, in which Jews 
and Arab s alike were free to purchase land. A second zone 
covered the hill co untr y , including Beersheva and the Gaza, and 
was o c cu pied predominantly by Arabs. In this 17,132,000 dunam 
ar ea (63.4 % of the total land area) Jewish purchases o f land were 
prohibited. The third zone covered the Plain of Esdraelon, 
eastern Galilee, and part s of the coastal plain and Negev; a 
total of 8,533 ,000 dunams (31.6% of the total land area) in 
which Jews could buy land freely from absentee Ara b owners 
(usually Turks and Syrians} but land could be bough t from res-
ident Palestinian Arabs only with the expre ss consent of the 
British High Commissioner . 34 The Jews already owned 688,00 0 
dunams in the free zone and protested that t he y were left only 
646,000 dunams (250 square miles) in which to es tablish the 
Jewish homeland. Palestinian Arab landowners also protested 
that their own land tran sac tions were c ontroll e d and limited 
by th e interveni ng British . Neverthe l ess, the Land Transfer 
Regulations remained in effect until the British left Pales-
tine i n 1948. 
The Brit ish main tained that existing Jewish set t l emen ts, 
particularily Zio nist settlements, were already over-expanded 
and th a t th ey did not possess enough land to provid e ample em-
ployment for their present populations, much l e ss for any new 
immigrants. Furthermore, because the PICA and JNF had been 
forced to buy the land for such ex orbitantly high prices, they 
COMPARATIVE RURAL LAND COSTS, 
PALESTINE AND·U.S.A. 
(in $ per acre) 
1920-22 1933-36 1940 1942 1944 
Rural Land Bought by 
Jews in Palestin e 
Value of Farmland, U.S.A. 
Value of Farmland Iowa 
$34 $128 $268 $470 $1050 
$31 
$71 
$32 
$79 
$35 
$85 
$45 
$111 
Source: Robert R. Nathan, Palestine: Problem and Promise. 
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often could not afford the initial capital investments necessary 
to make their newly purchased lands cultivable. Therefore, 
155,500 of the total 270,000 dunams owned by the JNF in 1930 
were held in reserve, waiting for available capital in order 
to be cultivated.35 The British felt that any Jewish population 
increase should be absorbed on this land already owned before 
more land was purchased. 
Zionist settlements were a source of greater irritation 
with both the British and Arabs than PICA settlements. Zionist 
settlements were guided by ideology whereas private PICA villages 
operated on a profit-motivated basis. The profitability of the 
citri-and viticulture in the private villages was not matched 
by Zionist settlements in their first few years. Zionists were 
concerned primarily on becoming self-sufficient and dep e ndent 
only on themselves for their survival. The system of mixed 
farming did lead to eventual self-suffici ency , but the struggle 
was long and tedious, and the burden on the JNF to sustain their 
settlements through their early lean years was great. Even 
after self-sufficiency had been achieved by the settlements, 
specializing to profi t in the market was never as high a pri-
ority as maintaining Zionist ideals. Unlike PICA settlements, 
Zionist colonies refused to hire Arab labor, nor would any land 
once in JNF possession ever be leased or resold to a non-Jew. 
Further growth of Zionist colonies was correctly perceived 
by the British to be a source of growing contention between 
Arabs and Jews. The British concluded that Jewish expansion 
should be sharply curtailed. The immigration policy of "economic 
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absorptive capacity" was abandonned in 1939. The ne w policy 
was blatantly political and limited the number of Jewish immi-
grants to 75,000 over the next five years, after which no fur~ 
ther Jewish immigration would be allowed into Palestine without 
Arab cons ent . 36 
Jewish agricult ure i n Pal e stine duri ng the 1930s was 
greatly influenced by the world economic situation, particular-
ily by the e conomic impact of World War II. The world inflation 
caused by the war demand raised the price the Jewish farmer 
received for his products in both domestic and export markets. 
Such a position allowed many of the Zionist colonies to reduce 
their debt owed to the JNF and to become self-sufficient. The 
favorable price incr ease a ll owed the majority of Jewish farmers 
to increase their equipment sufficiently to br ing forth a more 
semi-intensiv e type of farm, requiring greater ir riga tion . As 
farms becam e more i nt ens iv ely cu ltivated, empha sis was shifted 
to more profita ble dairy production and away from less profitable 
unirrigated fi eld crops. The improv eme nt in capital equipment 
and farm intensifi ca tion led to a sixt y -six p er cent increas e in 
the output of Jewi s h mixed farms from 1939 to 1944, while Jewish 
employment in th o se mixed farms remained practically stationary. 
The final output of Jewish mixed farms in the 1943-44 h a rvest 
season consisted of 38.7 % dairy products, 20.5% poultry products, 
15.4 % vegetables, 7.8% fruit, 7.6 % wheat, and 10% oth e r products. 37 
Citriculture exp anded until 1936, but as the thr e at of 
World War II increased throughout Europe, those European markets 
48 
began to constrict. Being a more luxurious food commodity than 
the vegetables and grains produced on the mixed farms, the de-
mand for citrus fruits fell rather than increased as inflation 
worsened and markets became tighter throughout Europe. In 
the 1938-39 season 60% of Palestine's orange exports went to 
the United Kingdom, 11.5% went to Holland, 6.5% went to Belgium, 
9.5% went to Scandanavia, and the remainder of Europe took the 
final 11.9 percent.38 Palestine's increasing output came to be 
concentrated in a few markets; those markets being determined 
by the British government. As the war progressed and Britain's 
and her allies ' markets became even tighter, export prices fell 
drastically. These conditions forced many citrus farmers to 
abandon their plantations because they could not cover their 
co sts of production. By 1944 about 40,000 dunams of citrus 
had been uprooted or abandonned. The citrus industry did sur-
vive th e blow, however, and overall, Palestinian agricultural 
prices, output, and farm incomes rose as a result of World War II. 
Arab Agricultural Practices 
Despite any political contentions and claims of the Arab 
fellaheen population being forced from their lands, the fella-
heen profitted from 1917 to 1948 due to the Jews' presence and 
influence in Palestine. The Arabs adopted new cultivation tech-
nique~ including irrigation. PICA settlements employed seasonal 
Arab labor in their citrus plantations, and the fellah's eco-
nomic status was further benefitted. Finally, general health 
and social standards, including educational opportunities, 
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improved in Arab villages influenced by Jewish settlements. 
But Arab agriculture still remained backward when compared 
to Jewish standards of agricultural development and production, 
and the restrictive communal tenancy system of Mesha'a still 
persisted. In 1919 about 400,000 Arabs farmed about five million 
dunams of Palestinian soil, and by 1944 the number had increased 
to over 700,000 people on seven million dunams.39 About 80,000 
fellah farms, consisting of between fifty to one hundred dunams 
of cultivated land existed in 1946. Cereals accounted for 35-
40 % of the total value of Arab agricultural ou tput; milk and 
meat production was at about 15% of output; olives at 20%; 
fr uit at 12%; vegetables at 13%; and poultry at a round 5% of 
production. 40 Agricultural production was divided among r egions; 
farms growing olives and cereals were in the hilly regions, and 
v egetables were concentrated on the plains and near towns. 
The fellah possessed few capital resources, but usually 
own ed a few sheep and goats, a dozen chickens, two oxen or cows, 
and occasionally a camel. He still tilled the soil with a tra-
ditional wood en iron-tipped plow which broke the soil and allowed 
water to enter, but no more. Th e fellah's farm was a striking 
contrast to his Jewish neighbor's, be the Jewish settlement a 
private village, kibbutz, or moshav. Fellaheen did, however, 
follow the example of their more advanced Jewish counterparts 
to the extent that their financial and capital limitations on 
expansion allowed. Emphasis on cattle over sheep and goats in-
creased, and poultry, vegetable, o.li ve _, and fruit production 
expanded. This reflected a greater prosperity and security of 
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markets in that benefits from the planting of such crops could 
only be enjoyed in four or five harvest seasons. Returns from 
cereal crops, however, began the very season the crop was 
planted. Sheep and goats reached maturity soon before cows 
and produced milk at an earlier age. Insecure markets and sub-
sistence production caused the fellaheen to be concerned only 
with each year's crop for his very survival. The future was 
something he had not previously been able to afford considering. 
Arab agriculture underw e nt no radical stru c tural changes as a 
result of World War II since farm prices and output rose as a 
result of war de mand and i nflation. From 1935 to 1939 th e 
fellah offerred 33% of his total production for market sa~~ and 
incr e ased only to 34.5 % in the 1943-44 harvest season, with an 
output expansion of about 15 p e r c ent.41 The progress of the 
fellah farm during the Ma ndate was along traditional lines; 
it involved th e planting of more olive and fruit trees and more 
summer crops, but it involved no major undertaking of mechan-
ization. The 34.5% of total Arab agricultural production offer-
red for market sale compared to the 75% of Jewish agricultural 
produce being sold at the marketplace during the same season. 42 
The Palestine that existed at the end of the Mandate in 
1948 contrasted sharply with the Palestine that had existed in 
1917. After World War II, Palestinian agriculture, both Arab 
and Jewish, and citrus and non-citrus, no longer represented 
self-contained subsistence enterprises, but was slowly moving 
toward increased specialization and marketing for export. 
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Methods of modern agricultural production were changing all 
over the world, and though beset with unique political, social, 
and economic problems, Palestinian agriculture also progressed. 
Just as World War I signified the introduction of British 
presence in Palestine, World War II signified its exit. The 
dual Mandate goa l s of both securing British authority in the 
Middle East and establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine 
had failed. By 1947 the political situation had deteriorated 
to a point such that the British were forced to turn the Arab/ 
Jewish dilemna in Palestine over to the United Nations. On 
May 13, 1948, the British Mandatory Government ceased to exist 
in Palestine. The following day the United Nations' newly par-
tioned state of Israel came into existence. 
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EXPANSION OF ARAB AGRICULTURE (1921-1943) 
Olive Output Vegetables Heads of Heads of 
Years Average ( tons) ___ _( ton ~l_ Cattle Donj<~~-
- --- -
1921-1926 17,000 11 , 000 102,000 . 32,000 
1933-1938' 26,000 60,000 120,000 75,000 
1939-1943 47,000 160,000 215,000 105,000 
Source: Statistical Records of the Jewish Agency 
rlur.1ber of Vi 11 acies 
Total Area (dunams 
Cultivated Area 
JRAB VILLAGES 
Prior to May 1948 
-364 
4,310,536 
2, 752. ,000 
194 8- l 9S 7 
88 
l,2.]6,000 
553,000 
Source: Statistical Records of the Jewish Agency 
COiHRIBUTION OF CITRUS TO PALESTINE'S EXPORTS 
1927-1939 
Year 
1927 
1931 
1935 
1939 
Total Exrorts 
(Thousands of -r t ) 
1900 
1572 
4215 
5118 
Citrus Exports 
(Thousands of It,') 
814 
886 
3131 
3811 
Source: Respective Annual Issues of Statistical Abstracts 
llarves t Season 
! . 
1 <:J38-39 
1941-42 
104 2- 43 
l 913-'14 
PALESTINE FARt1 PRICES 
(indices with base year of 1938) 
Arab Agriculture 
11)0 
320 
450 
S/:il) 
Je1-vi sh 
54 
Citrus Percent 
of Tota 1 
43% 
56% 
74% 
741~ 
Agriculture 
1 '1 0 
?.20 
340 
461) 
Source: Robert Nathan, Palestine, Problen and Promise. p. 215. 
THE JEWISH SETTLEMENTS IN THE 
VALLEY OF JEZREEL 1921-1925 
- Principal Jewish settlements 
est ablished in 1921 and 1922 
Land over 500 feet 
• Arab towns and villages 
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Between 1920 and 1925 the Jewish National 
Fund spent nearly o million Egyptian pounds 
buying land in th eValleyof Jezreel. By 1925 
over 2,600 Jews had settled in the valley, 
and 3,000 acres of barren hillside had been 
aff ores ted. This previous ly uncultivated land, 
bought at high ly inflated prices, became the 
pattern of all subsEtquent Jewish National 
Fund set tlement s in Palestine 
,_ 
When I f1rsr saw 1t in 1920 i t was a desolation . Four or five small and squalid Arab villages. long distances apart 
fr om one an ot her . coul d be seen on the summits of low hills here and there . For :he res :. the country w as unm · 
hab1red There '"'"·'s nor a house. not a tree about 51 soua,c md es of the valley have now been purchas ed by rhe 
Je wish N at10·1al Fun d Twenty schools have been opened There 1s an Agnculru ral Tra1nmg Co!lege for Wo men in 
one villc19e ,;•1d a hoS/Jltal "' another All rhe swamps and marshes w 1th,n the area tl>at !>as been colonised have 
IJPcn dra1•1i:d The whole asp ect of the val ley has been cha nged .. 1n the spnny the fields of vegetables 01 of ce1e,1ls 
cover many mil es of th e land , dnd what live years ago was l1rt'e better than a wild ern ess 1s being trans lorm ed before 
au, eyc5 ,n ro srrn llny cnunrrys ,dc SIR H SA MU(L'S REPORT ON TH( ADMINISTR ATION Of PAUSTINl. 22 APR IL 191~ 
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JEWISH SETTLEMENTS AND IMMIGRATION, 1931 -1942 
Jewish settlements establi shed 
between 1931 and 1939 
Entry points for' illegal' immigrants, 
who were landed on the open 
beaches, often at night 
Palestin e ,s our only anchor in 
th ese days of adve rsity . If c he 
gates of Palestine are closed 
th ere is no hope left . 
FRANZ KAHN TO THE ZIONIST 
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Despite the Arab ri ot s of 1929, Jewi sh 1mrn1grat1on continue d lo grow . ancl Jewish settlements were 
found ed throu ghou t Palestine. The Arab leaders prot este d against this new influx of immi grant s and 
refugees, and follo win g a new Arab campaign 1n 1936. the Bri tish authori t ies introdu ced a strict 1111111 
to Jewi sh imrniwa ti on ( a maxim um of 8,000 betw een August 1937 and Mar ch 1938). As i'I result of 
st ill more Arab pres sur e. the British publi shed th ei r Palestin e Wh ite Paper on 17 Mi'ly 1939. Only 
10.643 Jew s were allowed to ent N ir11940, 4,592 111 941 and 4,206 in 1942, at a ti me wh en th e herce 
C,erman persecu ti on of Jew s in Europe made the need for a plc1ce of refuge a desperil l e one. Between 
Ju ly 1934 and September 19:l9 th e Z1on1sts disembarked 15,000 'illegal· imm igrants on the Pnlest1ne 
coast , from ii to tal o f 43 shi ps . On 4 Septemb er 1939 two ' ill qJil l · i111r111grant s were ki lled when the ir 
shi p was fired on by a Br1t1sh cul ter. L,1ter 'illegals' were depo rt ed to Cyprus c1nd rv1aur1t1us 
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BRITISH RESTRICTIONS ON 
JEWISH LAND PURCHASE 1940 
- · - Boundary of Brita in's 
Palestine Mandate, 1922·1948 
fg] Area closed by Britain to 
all further Jewish land 
purchase after 28 February 
1940 (4,104,000 acres) 
Land bought by Jews 
between 1880 and 1940, 
within the area closed to 
all future Jewish purchase 
in 1940 
0 Areas of dense Jewish land 
settlements before 1940, 
in which Jews were to be 
aflowed to cont inue to 
buy land 
m Areas of substantial Jewish 
settleme nt before 1940, in 
which further Jewi sh 
purchases were to be 
str ictly curtailed 
l'il,· 
These regulations prevented the Jews 
from extending their land holdings in 
three main areas of Jewish settlement: 
around Jerusalem, around Beersheba, 
and nort h of Acre 
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The effect of these Regulat ,ons 
,s that no Jew may iJCQwre ,n 
Palest me a plo t r;I /in d. a 
budding , or B tree . or any ngh t 
m wate r. except ,n towns and 
a very sm3/I pnrt of the country 
The Regular ,or.s deny to Je ws 
equa/,fy before the lilw and 
introdu ce racial d1scn mmat1on 
Thf'y con/me the Jews w 1th1n 
d sma ll pale nf settle mem 
s imila r to th.Jt ,.-.,.h,che,,srt.~dm 
C1a11st Ru ssia bef oi t• the last 
wa, . and such as nciwe ~1sr~ 
only undN Nat t rule They not 
only v10I.Jte the ter ms of the 
A1anda re bu t completely 
nulldy ,ts pnma,y pu ,po st.• 
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THE FRONTIERS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 
1949 -1967 
Following the Arab decision to invade Israel in 
May 1948, the Israelis not only defen ded the 
land allocated to them by the United Nations, 
but extended the area under their control. 
The frontiers established in 1949 rema ined 
the de facto borders until 1967, but during 
these eighteen years none of Israel's Arab 
neighbours agreed to make peace with her, or 
to recognize the perman ent existence of her 
borders 
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~ Territory beyond the United Nation s line 
conquered by Israel, 1948 · 1949 
The fronti ers of the State o f Israel 
according to the Arm ist ice agreements 
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Patterns of Agricultural Development and Land Settlement 
in the State of Israel 
59 
The problems facing Jewish agriculture and land settlement 
in Israel are radically different from those faced by Jews in 
Palestine. The Jewish Agency and JNF had been occupied with 
buying, settling, and developing a limited amount of agricul-
tural land for a small Jewish minority in an Arab nation. The 
Palestinian Land Transfer Regulations of 1939 had restricted 
Jewish land purchases and settlement to an area of under 500,000 
acres in its total extent. Prior to May of 1948 there were 265 
Jewish agricultural settlements in Palestine with a total rural 
population of 105,000 on 1,600,000 dunams of cultivated land. 
This compared with 364 Arab villages and a rural Arab population 
of 372,000, with 2,752,000 dunams under Arab cultivation. 4 3 
Overnight the Jews acquired jurisdiction to a total of 20,873,469 
dunams. The most distinguishing characteristic of the ensuing 
national development, inc luding agricultural development, was 
the sense of urgency in establishing and implementing a policy 
by which to in tegrat e and maintain a skyrocketing population. 
The Jews had been waiting and preparing for the restoration of 
their homeland for almost two thousand years, but ideological 
preparations do not feed a nation, ensure its economic viabil-
ity, or secure its borders. 
The state of Israel existed. And so did the 340,000 Jews 
who arrived within the first eighteen months of statehood. The 
immigration policy had changed from " abso rptive economic capac-
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ity" to an "o pen door" policy stated in the 1950 National Law 
of Return. Israel was "open to the immigration of Jews from 
all countries of the dispersi on." During the Mand ate , the 
rate of immigration had averaged 18,000 annually. Duri ng the 
first three years of statehood that r ate averaged 18,000 a 
month. Between May 15, 1948 and June 30,1953, th e Jewish pop-
ulation of th e country doubled . 
The reasons for this massive and immediate influx of i m-
migrants were both ideological and pragmatic . An ''open door" 
policy was a funda~ental aspect of Zionist ideology. Every 
Jew was encouraged to return to his Biblical home l and. This 
was one of the very reasons for Israel's existence. But the 
new government also recognized the very real political and 
economic need for an instant population to defend and inhabit 
the already threat ened nation .* The Settlement Aut hority of 
the Jewish Agency thereupon set out to absorb these new immi-
grants and to weave a new society composed of people from all 
corners of the earth. For ideological reasons of labor on the 
soil and practical r eason s of defense and self-sufficiency, 
rural and agricultu ral settlement was viewed as an int egral part 
*The d ay after I srael 's declaration of independence the com-
bined forces of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan attacked 
the new state of Israel. All immediat e considerations regard-
ing the establishment of national policies of immigration, 
se t tlement, agricultural, and industrial development were 
therefore implemented under th e even more immediate and pres-
sing preoccupation with the war. Israel's War of Independence 
lasted fr om May of 194 8 to April of 1949. 
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in building the new Israeli society. 
The major problem of Israel's massive immigration, other 
than its sheer volume, and a factor felt acutely when attempt-
ing to integrate new immigrants into their new country, was 
the conflict between "western" and "oriental" immigrants. 
Immigrants from western and central European countries had com-
posed the vast majority of Jewish immigration into Palestine 
in its pre-state days. For the first four years of statehood, 
most Jews entering Israel came pouring out of post World War 
II Europe. These European immigrants were unlike their prede-
cessors who ha d b ee n h a rdy, idealistic, and pioneering Zionists. 
The newcomers we re coming from the Nazi deathcamps and crema-
toriums and from the Nazi sphere of terror. Most of them were 
aged, sick, weak, disillusioned, and not at all inspired by the 
chall e nge of settling a frontier agricultural outpost. The 
psychological hardship of adjusting to their new country was 
compounded by their first encounters with their fellow Jewish 
immigrants from Moslem nations; the "oriental" Jews. The Jews 
of Asia and Africa had a much more traditional and family-
oriented lifestyle and set of values and were not committed to 
a Zionist ideal of collective labor on the soil. The need to 
create a new Jewish national identity had never been greater. 
The central problem facing the Settlement Authority of the 
Jewish Agency* was twofold. First, there was the need to create 
*Upon establishment of the state of Israel, the Jewish Agency 
created a Land Settlement Auth ority to settle and integrate 
new immigrants into the country. The Settlement Author ity is 
not a government institution; but as part of the Jewish Agency 
a new and integrated society out of two groups of people, 
worlds apart in their origin, thought patterns, lifestyles, 
and values, into an alien and hostile environment. Secondly, 
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that society was to be based on labor and returns from the land, 
and built by immigrants who had merchant and tradesman skills, 
but little agricultural knowledge. Israel's pattern of national 
development was a reversal of most nations' development. In-
stead of progressing from a traditional rural and agrarian 
society into a modern industrial nation, Israel's goal was to 
create a solid agricultural foundation on which to base its 
industrial growth. Most importantly, Israel lacked th e time 
to smoothly progress from one form of society to another. 
Plans of action, not progressive transition, had to be imple-
mented immediately. Indeed the new government lacked every-
thing--time, suitable manpower, money, and security--everything 
that is, except polici es . 
A system of national land ownership, not unlike the pre-
vious Ottoman system, was continued. But the new nationali-
zation of natural resources was more wholely integrated and less 
restrictive of personal rights. All water and natural resources 
were nationalized upon the state's establis hment, as were waste 
and uncultivat ed areas. At the end of Israel's first decade 
of independence, the government and settlement agencies owned 
77.3% of the land. The JNF controlled 16.3%, the PICA 7%, and 
private Jewish and Arab ownership totalled only 3.1% and 2.6% 
it constitutes the link between Jews outside and inside 
Israel. The Settlement Authority is closely aliggee 
and works directly with the Ministry of Agriculture. 
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respectively.44 The official government policy regarding agri-
cultural development was passed by the Knesset on March 11, 1949, 
and called for~ 
1) the rapid and balanced settlement of underpopulated 
areas, 
2) the continued reclamation of the land, irrigation pro-
jects in the Negev and valleys, afforestation of the hill areas, 
swamp drainage, and soil improvement, 
3) c ompulsory d e v e lopment of neglected l a nds, to be 
c ar ri e d out by t he newl y created State De velopment Au thority, and 
4) t he rehab il i tation an d e xpansion of cit rus grov es , an d 
i mpro v eme nts i n me th ods o f culti v ation and marketin g o f th e 
fruit. 
Among the immediate consequenc e s of the War of In d ep e n-
d en c e we re t h e abando nme nt of large land tracts by Arab owne rs 
and cultivators, the ne glect of orchards, and water wastage. 
Th e Ministry of Agriculture took possession of the lands that 
had be e n l e ft abandonned and uncultivated, and either undertook 
the cultivation of the lands through its own department or 
transferred th e lands to others for cultivation. The original 
owners of the land received the net land rental paid to the 
Ministry of Agriculture by the cultivator, but the entire land's 
yield belonged to its new cultivator. 
Following the same line of taking national control of 
abandonned lands, t he Knesset passed the Absentee Property Act 
in 1950. A council and Custodian of Absentee Property were ap-
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pointed by the Minister of Agriculture to administer the lands 
owned by Arabs who resided in an area no longer a part of Pal-
estine or who had evacuated their homes and landholdings because 
of the military conflict. The custodian registered all absentee 
property, made any investments necessary for the land's main-
t enan ce, cultivated the groves and land found suitable for that 
purpose, and under limitations, could sell and lease the prop-
erty under his control. Lands under the jurisdiction of the 
Custodian of Absentee Property were organiz ed into administered 
farms and became centers for r esearch and experimentation in 
crop cultivation. 
The sale of landed property in Israel was assigned to the 
new government's Development Authority. Only the Development 
Authority was authorized to buy, sell, or transfer land. The 
goals of the JNF and the Israeli government were reall y one in 
the same: to insure and fortify Jewish control of th e land. 
The JNF became closely aligned with the Ministry of Agricul-
ture, but it continu ed to be an independent Zionist organization 
receiving worldwide funds for its continued expansion of agri-
cultural settlements. The state technically owned tha land and 
the JNF developed it; leasing their holdings to Zionist settle-
ments. Abandonned or unused lands determined by the Development 
Authority to be outside the realm of public use, such as housing 
construction for immigrants or other development, first had to 
be offerred to the JNF for sale or extended lease. Upon JNF 
rejection of the land, the Development Authority could offer 
the land to other agencies or individuals. 
65 
The first transaction between the Development Authority 
and JNF transferred 1,092,000 dunams of absentee property to 
JNF holdings. Within the first ten years of statehood , the , 
JNF increased its holdings to 3,329,000 dunams as compared to 
the 924,000 dunams acquired before 1948--an increase in hold-
ings of over 250 percent.45 The removal of all restrictions 
of land acquisition by Jews enabled the JNF to realize its 
original purpose, the transfer of the land of Israel to the 
people of Israel. 
Settlement policy in Israel's early years of development 
was guided by Israel ' s unique economic, social, and security 
situation. Israel's leadeiship, all fervent Zionists who had 
long been present in Palestine, still believed that a thriving 
agricultural population should be the basis for th ei r society. 
That idealized, yet at tainable society was to be marked by 
cooper ation from all various e conomic and social sectors. No 
fragmented section of the economy was to expand rapidly and 
profitably at the expense of retarded development throughout 
the rest of the country. But when faced with the harsh real-
ities of limited resources and time, priority decisions for 
allocating their scarce resources had to be made. Should water 
be developped to further expand the agricultural sector or to 
build a greater industrial sector? Should new immigrants be 
integrated into urban centers or should new rural communities 
be established? Where should financial funds for development 
be concentrated, and how should they be divided? 
The Zionist belief of both the land's and man's rejuvin-
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ation by physical labor on the soil predominated national policy. 
A nation of modern Jewish "pseudo-peasants" was the goal of 
settlement policy. This goal was to be achieved by formulating 
and adhering to a number of specific aims. First, the national 
community was to be balanced and the greatest amount of the 
population dispersed into rural areas. A new large-scale sys-
tem of agriculture was to be integrated with the overall national 
production effort . Planned integration assured that all farmers 
would earn an ad~quate living and that the urban population 
would be fed. A large proportion of new immigrants were to be 
both productively employed and adequately fed by increasing 
domestic foodstuff production. Ample domestic food production 
would also further national goals by reducing expensive food 
imports and by expanding the demand for non-agricultural goods, 
thereby increasing urban employment. The location of new set-
tlements was largely determined by defense requirements. The 
immediate establishment of agricultural communities in th e un-
derpopulated areas of the Negev and Galilee hills filled the 
vacuums created by the mass Arab exodus and blocked military 
infiltration against armistice lines. Finally, th e new rural 
settlements were to provide new immigrants with economic and 
social security. In addition to assuring a livlihood by pro-
ductive employment, the rural community was to provide for the 
new immigrants' emotional needs for security and acceptance. 
Only when a man felt himself to be a vital part of his new so-
ciety could he contribute productively toward both his own self-
sufficiency and that of the national economy. 
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These aims were made into realities by adhering to three 
principles whose origins were to be found in the history of 
Zionist agricultur e in Palestine. Practices and policies which 
originated in pre-state Palestine formed the basis of modern 
settlement and farm planning in Israe1.46 The first of these 
principles was nationally owned land. This ensured that the 
land would not be fragmented or lost to the Jewish people by 
transfer of ownership. The second principle was that of family 
labor. The initial lo an extended to a farmer by the Land Set-
tlement Authority guaranteed the farmer ample resources to 
provide for himself and his family. In keeping with the Zion-
ist ideal of non-exploitative labor on the soil, the farm's 
lay-out and production system were designed compactly, enabl ing 
the farmer to hav e easy access to every phase of his farm's 
operation. Hired labor would be unne cessa ry. Thirdly, an 
income criterion guaranteed a farmer the opportunity to earn 
an income at le ast as large as his urban counterpart. The 
Settlement Authority assured that all new farmers had the same 
physical production resources at their disposal no matter where 
their settlement be located. This principle limited the size 
of new settlements and the number of settlers to proportions 
that also insured an equal income opportunity for all, and re-
garded the overall demand for agricultural commodities. 47 
The greatest problem involved in creating and integrating 
new agricultural settlements centered around the immediate 
haste with which the new imi~igrants needed to be settled. For 
the first five years following statehood . immigrants to Israel 
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entered transit camps from which they awaited permanent set-
tlement. Initially, new communities were established with little 
regard for the immigrant's individu al ethnic background. Herein 
lay the inherent dilemna of such a settlement policy. A "normal" 
way of life for a Polish Jew in no way resembled a normal tra-
ditional lifestyle for a Yeminite Jew. The two cultures clashed 
and this clash was intensified by the newness of the country into 
which both the eastern and western · Jew were set. Immigrants 
from neither world felt secure and identified with a community 
that was also composed of the other group of immigrants. 
The social aspect of village integration was of even greater 
importance to the Settlement Authority than the immediate eco-
nomic viability of th e new settlement s. By 1953 a ''ship to 
village" policy of settling and integrating entire ethnic groups 
into agricultural settlements evolved . This system of greater 
selectivity regarding a settlement's ethnic composition led to 
far greater success in integrating the new settlements both 
within their own populations and within th e greater national 
community. 
A principle set forth by Dr. Ruppin in 1910 was strictly 
followed in the matter of settlement patterns: no one could 
force a new settler to live within a social framework not of 
his own choosing. What resulted from this policy was a striking 
change in the character of Israel's agricultural settlements 
from its pre-state days. More than 75% of the settlements es-
tablished since 1948 have been moshavim, due largely to the in-
creased proportion of oriental Jews entering the country. The 
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eastern Jews preferred the greater privacy of the moshav frame-
work as compared to the kibbutz.* The moshav emphasis on indi-
vidual family living an d flexibility within the scope of coop-
eration appealed to the more traditional immigrants of Asia 
and North Africa who did not possess the individual means with 
which to settle and cultivate the land but for the aid of the 
Jewish Agency. The moshav, with individual family ties intact , 
allowed for a more gradual process of change into life in a new 
country than the kibbutz. Unthreatened, traditional family 
pat terns slowly yet smoothly adapted themselves to a more western 
culture . 
Gone we re the days of a pioneering spirit toward harsh 
co nditions and r ec lam at ion of th e land by fervent Zionists. 
Yet life in the early years of the new settlements was still 
harsh and relentlessly demanding of all a man's efforts . Ideo-
logical motives and incentives of comrnu nalisrn were replaced by 
tangible advantages of privacy and profit. Most of the communal 
and cooperative settlements established after 1948 were near 
aba ndonned Arab vi ll ages and faced prob lems of both security 
a nd self - sufficiency. The narrow coastal plain between Haifa 
and Ashque lon was the first r egion to be covered with new Jewish 
farming communities . Then came the hills of the Jerusalem Cor-
idor between J e rusal e m and Tel-Aviv, and finally the northern 
and southern regions of Israel . But the agriculture crash pro-
*On e hundred and thirty - six of the two hundred and thirty-one 
immigrant settlements were founded by eastern Jews who had no 
Zio nist indoctri n a tion at all, and only ninety-five were set -
tled by th eir western counterparts. 
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gram of population decentralization was beset with social prob-
lems not normally encountered in the development of a national 
economic and agricultural policy. Between 1948 and 1958, 35% 
of the new immigrants who had been settled in cooperative farm 
communities left them and went to the urban areas of Jerusalem, 
Tel-Aviv and Haifa. Despite the setbacks of immigrant inte-
gration, limited money, and no t~me, the early efforts were not 
a failure. The percentage of Israel's population in its three 
major citi es declined from 52% in 1948 to 31 % in 1957. In the 
ten year span between 1948 and 1958 the Jewish rural popula-
tion increased thr eefold to 325,000, and 3,900,000 dunams of 
land were under cultivation.48 
In terms of long-run gain the agricultural policy in the 
ear ly years of the state was not the most eff icient policy that 
co uld have been adhered to. Indeed, it paved the way for many 
of the crises involving wage and price subsidies, shortages, 
and surpluses the agricultural community was to face in the 
coming years. But immediate problems wer e too great to allow 
policy makers in the early years of development the luxury of 
thinking in terms of the long-run. The immediate needs were 
to settle and integrate a massive influx of new citizens, to 
provide domestic foodstuff production for the expanding pop-
ulation, and to secure national borders. Self-sufficiency was 
the for emost goal of agricultural policy. Mixed farming con-
tinued to be the basis of new settlements established before 
1953. Such a system had filled the food consumption needs of 
th e Palestinian Jewish settlements, and the succeeding policy 
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NUMBER OF LAND AREA 
YEAR AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENTS,., INHABITANTS (DUNAMS) 
1899 22 5,000 300,000 
1914 44 12,000 400,000 
1930 107 45,000 1,050,000 
1936 203 98,300 1,480,000 
1939 252 137,000 1,650,000 
Source: Walter Clay Lawdermilk, Palestine, Land of Promise. 
Number of Set tle ments 1947/48 1953/54 Incr ease 
Kibbutzim 145 216 71% 
Mosh av 0vdim 72 250 178% 
Private Mosh ava 15 50 35% 
Source: Haim Halperin, Changing Patterns in Israel Agriculture 
THE RELATION BETWEEN SETTLEMENT PATTERNS 
IN 194 7 AN1'.l 1,.g, 7 
1947 1957 
Number of Percent Number of-~--
Settlement Pattern Settlements of Total Settlements 
Private Village 30 11.5 35 
Kibbutz 145 56 . 0 253 
Moshav Ovdim 72 29.0 358 
Moshav Shitufi 6 2.3 18 
Oth er forms 3 1.2 32 
Total 256 100.0 696 
---, -
ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF KIBBUTZIM AND MOSHAVIM 
IN 1947 AND 1957 
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-Percent 
of Total 
5.0 
36.4 
51. 3 
2.6 
4.7 
lDO.O 
Kibb utzim % Moshavim % 
Geographic Origin 1947 1957 1947 1957 
Middle East -3. 2 15.5 8 . 5 33.7 
Far East 1.9 6.7 2.5 7.6 
North Africa 1.5 19. 8 3 .7 20.7 
Balkan States 3.5 5.0 6.0 5.3 
Eastern E.'urope 56.2 25.1 54.6 22.3 
Western Countries 33.7 27.9 24.7 10.4 
Source: Raa.nan Weitz and Avsh alom Rokach, Agricultural Development: 
Planning and Impl ement ation (Israel Case Study) 
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assumed that such a mixed system would best continue to make 
the new country self-sufficient in its food requirements. 
The "ship to village" process of immigrant settlement was 
running smoothly and more or less efficiently by 1953, and the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Settlement Authority were free to 
reevaluate their existing concepts of farm types. The mixed 
farm type provided a degree of agricultural self- sufficienci 
for both individual settlements and the nation, but it could 
not contribute substantially either to import reduction or ex-
port expansion. The system was limited by duplicated production 
p ractic es and equipment in each settlement wich prohibited both 
economies of scale and specialization. Israel's trade gap was 
widening every year as its primary exports were cit ru s and some 
winter vegetables, such as potatoes, onions, tomatoes, and cu-
cumbers. These were somewhat luxurious food commodities and 
subject to a sh or t period of time in which they had to be dis-
tributed on European markets before spoiling. These exports 
were faced with an extremely elastic demand, while imports were 
non-agricultural and primarily inelastic input commodities such 
as fuel, construction materials, and most importantly, military 
arms for defense. By 1957 the 14 % of Israel's population that 
was engaged in agriculture was producing 50% of the country's 
total food consumption needs and filling all of the domestic 
demand for dairy products, poultry, fruit, and vegetables. An 
increased percentage of the population engaged in agriculture 
would be a poor way of closing the trade deficit since the pro-
duction of agricultural surplus es for export was dependent pri-
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marily not on how many people were cultivating the land, but on 
factors of productivity, yields, and standards of technology 
employed in agriculture. Agriculture's increased contribution 
to the national economy lay not in increasing the number of its 
human contributors but in redirecting its production efforts 
from self-sufficiency to highly speci alized and automized units 
of production. 
Maintenance and expansion of the traditional mixed farming 
system had somewhat stifled the economy's full agricultural 
development potential. Ra=a-non ,Wei tz, an agricultural economist 
of the period, stressed in 1953 that" ... the expansion (of 
mixed farming) cannot be continued. The aim must be economic 
independence as soon as possible. If mixed farms are developed 
at the same pace as in recent years, a surplus supply of animal 
protein--eggs, milk , and meat--is inevitable, while import of 
ess e ntial foods, such as sugar, grains, and vegetable oils will 
increase. 11 49 The agri cultural econo mic needs of the Jewish 
nation of Israel were not those of the Jewish community in Pal-
estine . Yet the continued agricultural policy of mixed farming 
did not recogni ze this change. Self-sufficiency was not neces-
sar ily good econ omics, and an agricultural policy emphasizing 
sel f-sufficiency hindered full potential economic growth. It 
would have been more rational to immediately start to narrow 
Israel's trad e gap by specializing in areas that enjoyed a com-
parative advantag e in production, particularily citrus, to be 
used for export. Local climatic and soil conditions should 
play a larger part in determining a settlement's cultivated 
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crops rather than every settlement attempting to produce all 
of its own needs. The development of any modern economy and 
full agricultural integration into that development are marked 
by increased dependency between various sectors as they spec-
ialize in order to perform at their optimum. Resulting advan-
tages of speciali za tion--decreased production costs, gre ater 
resource intensification and skill of labor employed, and 
increased production--c an thereby be enjoyed. A shift was nec-
essary in agricultural policy's outlook moving from the inde-
pendence of mixed farming units toward the interdependence and 
greater national product afforded by specialization. Resources 
devoted toward establishing new agricultural settlements between 
1948 and 1953 had gone to further a system misguided in its 
efforts. 
The international demand for citrus fruits was not sub-
stantial enough to consider basing the entire country's produc-
tion efforts on specializing in this area. Furthermore, some 
of the practices in citrus cultivation (i.e. hired labor) were 
opposed by the greater amount of Zipnist settlements in the 
count ry. The mix e d farm, as established, was to become the 
basis of specialized farming, but it expanded to include the 
concept of a field crop farm. Instead of being self-reliant in 
all areas of dairy, vegetable, and poultry production, settle-
ments were to direct their efforts toward specialization in one 
of these areas or toward the new area of industrial field crops. 
Thus the four farm types upon which specialized farming came to 
revolve around, were dairy, citrus, field crop, and export 
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(primarily vegetables), with combination types, determined by 
farmer/government contracts and sp e cific area conditions. 
Agricultural policy in Israel is formulated and imple-
mented within the scope of a planned economy. Overall ten year 
p lans outline comprehensive goals and annual plans determine 
actual production quantities in order to further these goals. 
Indiv idual farmers or settlements contract with the government 
as to how much they a re to produce of a given foodstuff and the 
cultivator is guaranteed that this contracted quantity will be 
purchased either in the market or by the government.SO The 
relatively smooth transition from mixed farming to specialized 
farming was achieved because the government could greatly im-
prove the specialized farm's chances for success by guaran t eeing 
these minimum agricultural price lev els and planned production 
limits and quotas for agricultural products. By 19 5 3 the gov-
ernmen t's agricultur a l policy officially shifted from a self-
sufficient mixed farming basis to specialized farming. Com-
prehensive and annual plans were adjusted to call for higher 
amounts of industrial crops and less dairy and poultry produc-
tion. In order to guide the coming transformation in agricul-
tural settlements . the expansion of dairy farms was limited so 
that the branch would grow only by natural increase. Poultry 
fai~1ing would likewise be regulated. As established settlements 
were well on their way toward producing surpluses of these com-
modities, new farms throughout the country were developped with 
the knowledge that th e y could not develop a dairy or poultry 
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COMPARISONS BETWEEN MIXED AND SPECIALIZED FARMING PRACTICES 
MIXED FARMING 
1) Evenly balanced labor schedule throughout the year. 
2) Economic sense of security ·by decreased risks. 
3) Land fertility is maintained. 
4) Since a large part of the produce is for home consumption and the 
goods sold are varied, there is relative independence of market 
fluctuations; is one pr oduct finds a poor market price, it is 
probable that another will make up for it. 
5) The farm does not have to invest heavily in production resources 
or engage in large-scale buying and selling procedures. 
§_) The income is balanced throughout the year. 
SPECIALIZED FARMING 
1) Farm branches most suited to the regional conditions can be devel-
oped ar:1d other particular advantages can be utilized for efficient 
agriculture. Regional specialization connects wit h appropriate 
commercial frameworks to obtain the maximum from agricultural 
resources. 
2) The farmer can concentrate his efforts on a limited numb er of 
branches and become expert in them, raising his production standards 
3) A large - scale of output enjoys economies of scale: qualit y standard-
ization, cheaper packaging and transport, and more competitive 
prices. 
4) Farms, villages, and regions can be planned for efficient production 
marketing, and transportation of the bulk output. 
5) Investments can be geared toward specific branches so that special-
ized equipment becomes economically worthwhile. 
ISRAEL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE, BEFORE AND AFTER SPECIALIZATION 
(in millions of Israel pounds) 
1948 - 44.4 
1949 - 56.3 
1954 - 307.4 
1959 - 749.5 
1962 - 1161. 3 
1964 - 1355 
1966 - 1623 
1970 - 2509.9 
Source: Economy, David Horn\'·1itz, editor. 
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branch. Emphasis was directed toward the production of indus-
trial crops and irrigated grains. 
Field Crop Type 
The vast majority of cooperative and communal settlements 
established since 1953 are of the field crop farm type. Field 
crop farming changed the character of Israeli farming. New 
crops and new methods of irrigation and cultivation emerged 
and came to dominate agriculture by the late 1950s. 
The field crop farm type introduced industrial crops to 
Israel's agriculture. Agriculture intensified (i.e. greater 
application of irrigation and fertilizers) and field crop 
farms achieved greater yields from the land than th e ir prede~ 
cessor mix ed farms. The vast majority of the area under field 
crops consisted of barley, hay, fodder, sown pastures, legumes, 
and oats, and was used for feeding livestock. Throughout the 
1950s no more than 15% of field crop production was produced 
for direct human consumption. 51 In the ensuing decades a re-
distribution of crops evolved, increasing the production of 
vegetables and ind ustrial crops such as flax, tobacco, and 
cotton for direct human consumption at the expense of produc-
tion for th e fe eding of livestock. This evolved only after 
fodder harvests yielded more than was necessary for livestock 
foodstuffs. It still remains more profitable to produce cereal 
for fee d rather than for market; the cereal being converted 
into a more valuable form of live protein such as milk, eggs, 
or meat. 
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The field crop farm type was different from dairy and cit-
rus farms in that it enc ompassed a larg er area and had no cat-
tle. The only livestock consisted of an average of three hun-
dred chickens and a few sheep for meat and wool, where grazing 
area was available.52 
The physical layout of the new field crop farm d~ffered 
from that of the mixed farm in that cultivated lands were sep-
arate from each farmhouse and farmyard so that optimal culti-
vation and irrigation methods could be applied cooperatively 
over the entire village's holdings. A balanced rotation of 
winter and summer industrial crops was planned to provide year-
round employment. Though the overall annual balance of the 
labor schedule ac hieved by the mixed farm was greater than 
that of the field crop farm, the principle of self-labor by 
the work of the farmer and his family was maintained. The 
principle of eq ual income opportunity was also adhered to in 
that the Mini s try of Agriculture set minimum prices for fie ld 
crop farm p r oducts, and the Settlement Authority a ll ocated 
reso ur ces (in itial supp li es of capital st oc k and equipment) 
in such a manner that th e pro fitabi li ty of the field cro p 
farm was insured to be the sam e as th e firmly established and 
successful dairy farm type. 
The prospective farmer's initial hesitancy to engage in 
field crop farming because of its new n e ss, and his unwilling-
ness to experiment with crops that had never been planted in 
Israel befor e wa s greatly reduced by the government and Set-
tlement Aut hority's policies. The cultivation of his crops 
YIELDS ROR FIELD CROP RODUCTION FOR SELECTED YEARS 
(1948 - 1971) 
(TONS) 
Crop 
.12_4_?.L 49_ ]15_3.Li 4__ 1970/ll 
\~heat 16,500 23,800 l, 129,000 
Barley 17,000 77,600 158,000 
Hay 40,500 126,000 279,000 
Green fodder and silage 373,000 671,000 282,000 
Groundnuts - . 300 15,000 56,000 
Tobacco : 1 so 19,000 
Sugar beet 6,750 40,000 
Flax 
~-380 
Cotton 338,000 
Sorghum and maize 7,650 40,500 50,000 
Oi 1 crops 550 2,100 25,000 
8] 
Sources: 1948/49 and 1953/54 figures; Haim Halperin, Changing Patterns in 
l_~ae_LAgri culture, p. 141 
1970/71 figures; Bank of Israel , Econo!'.1t_, p. 1G8 
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, 
might prove to be unprofitable in the long run, but the experi-
~ 
mentors were guaranteed that the crops they contracted to cul-
tivate would be purchased. The introduction of this new farm 
type proved to be highly successful, and within three years of 
its introduction (the 1955-56 harvest season) the yields and 
profitability of the specialized field crop farm were equal 
to that of the dairy and citrus farms. 
D~iry Farm Type 
The e volution of the dairy farm is of particular interest 
in terms of its transition to specialized farming in that it 
was one of th e found a tions of the mixed farms in Palestinian 
agriculture. The dev e lopment from the mixed farm to the spec-
ialized dairy farm, where the farmer produced almost nothing 
for his own ne e ds is illustrated on the following page. 
Farms specializing in dairy production were located mainly 
o n the fertile plains close to central urban areas. Each farm 
unit coming to specialize in dairy production was initially 
composed of 28 to 30 dunams of cultivable land, 26 to 28 of 
which were irrigated, with about 14 dunams being used for the 
growing of fodder, and about five dunams of fruit trees. Crop 
rotation of market and garden vegetables also existed, and any 
surpluses were fed to the cattle. Each farm ,started with a 
herd averaging from three to five milch cows and their young, 
and the milk production and fodder cultivation contributed over 
60% of the total annual income of the dairy farm between 1948 
and 1957. 53 As the dairy farm evolved in its transition to 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HE DAIRY FARM 
-6tructu~e · and Composition 
of th e Farm 
Total Land Holding (dunams) 
Total Water Quota (m3) 
Distribution of crops 
(cultivated area) 
Citrus groves 
Vegetables 
Hay and green fodder 
Grain 
Industrial cr,ops 
Dairy CO\'-/S 
Lay hens 
Percent of productio n for self 
consumption 
t1i xed Dairy Farm /'Is 
Est ablished 8etween 
1949-1955 
28 
15-17 
4 
If 
14 
7.2 
3.6 
3 
100 
10~12 
Net income from the farm at constant 
1964 prices (Israeli pounds) 3600-3900 
Dairy Farm Structure 
Officially Approved 
in 19 59 
28-30 
16--17 
5-6 
0-3 
117 
2 
4-8 
5 
200 
3-5 
:sooo 
8 3 . 
Speci alized Dairy 
Farm After The Completion 
06f Its Development· 
Period - 1970s 
28-30 
17 
5-6 
28 
8 
1-2 
6650 
Source: Raanan \.leitz and Avshalom Rokach, /-\aricu1tural Development : Planning and Implementation, !). 225-226 
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specia lized farming the farmer's secondary branches of limited 
fruit and vegetable production were gradually phased out. By 
1972 the income of the dairy farm was based solely on the main 
production branch of milk production, with the single aux-
illary branch of citrus groves. 
Each settlement, be it a kibbutz or moshav, has its own 
collection center where milk i s co ll ected and distributed on 
a cooperative basis. The farmer cooperative of Tn uva is the 
c e ntral marketing body for agricultural products in Israel 
a nd today markets over 90% of the milk and dairy products of 
dairy farms.54 
Citrus Farm Ty~ 
Citrus farms sufferred more than any other agricultural 
branch during World War II and Israel's War of Indep e nd en ce. 
World War II h ad destroyed export markets for citru s and the 
War of Independence destroyed th e cit ru s gr ov e s themselves. 
Only 126,360 dunams were includ ed in the census of citrus gr ov es 
in 1950-51, compared to 208,000 dunams of cultiv ated groves in 
1942. Of the total area cultivated in 1950-51, 2 8,571 dunams 
were cultivated by the Custodian of Absentee Property. After 
two years of r e habilitation of n eg lected groves and new plant-
ings, in 1953-54 the area under citrus cultivation had ex panded 
to 142,000 dunams .5 5 By 1968 about 1,500 citrus farms had been 
es tablished, mainly along the central an d southern coastal 
plains. The citrus farm typ e had been planned in 1955 to con-
sist of 28 dunams, ten of which were citrus groves, and eighteen 
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dunams of field crops. By 1970 the relationship had shifted 
to twenty dunams of citrus trees and eight dunams of field 
crops; mainly groundnuts and vegetables. The livestock con-
sisted of about two hundred hens, both for market and home 
use. Most of the income came from the citrus cultivation. 
The high degree of specialization increased both labor pro-
ductivity and efficient use of eq uipment. As the citrus crop 
was extremely vulnerable to market and weather vagaries, a 
small amount of field crop cultivation and poultry production 
was planned to ba l ance the labor schedule and provide the 
farmer with a greater degree of security. Citrus cultivation 
into a type of specialized farm had to undergo no transforma-
tion from a system of mixed farming as the citrus plantations 
had, from their establishment under Baron · Rothschild, always 
been of a mor e specialized nature. The specialized citrus 
farm type revived the citrus groves that had been destroyed 
in the 1940s and insulated it against further such catastrophes 
with the addition of auxillary field crops and poultry pro-
duction. 
By 1957 citriculture in Israel enjoyed advantages of highly 
efficient organization due to the existence of the Citrus Mar-
keting Board. This board, under the Minister of Agriculture's 
authority, influenced the rehabilitation of groves, improved 
methods of cultivation, set production quotas for citrus growers, 
and ensured that a farmer's crop would be purchased and mar-
keted. Citrus is Israel's largest agricultural export, rep-
resenting over half of the total annual agricultural exports 
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for the past ten years. The success of citriculture, both as 
a specialized farm type and major export, is due largely to 
the careful planning of the Citrus Marketing Boara.56 
Export Farm Type 
Citrus is Israel's primary agricultural export, but there 
is a large foreign--especially European--market for a wide var-
iety of Israeli produce, mainly vegetables, potatoes, melons, 
and fruit. Vegetable cultivation for market was not popular 
throughout most of the years of Palestinian agriculture because 
of the difficulties involved in marketing a perishable crop. 
The production of vegetables for market began und e r pressure 
of political distrubances during 1936 , when the Jewish market 
in Palestine was cut off from local and surrounding Arab growers 
who had been their main vegetable suppliers. New settlements 
founded since the creation of the state have contributed greatly 
toward the development of profitable vegetable growing for 
market. 
In 1952 plans for expansion of vegetable cultivation called 
for the establishment of new settlements to be based on vege-
table cultivation and improved methods of cultivation, organi-
zation, and agrotechnical methods. Producing vegetables for 
market, particularily foreign markets, is a highly specialized 
operation demanding skill, regional organization, and swift 
transporta t ion arrangements. The period of high prices for 
each product is short and the demand for high quality is great. 
Th e exploitation of this potentially valuable market depended 
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on the planning and building of farm units geared toward mar-
ket needs and organized on a regional basis to facilitate rap-
id grading, packing, and transport. The exp or t farm type was 
planned on the pattern of the fi e ld crop farm. Abo u t half 
the land in each farm unit wa s devoted to veget able and fruit 
cultivat ion when the export season was p ro fitable, the labor 
schedule being balanced by a smaller area of citrus groves 
for winter work. 
By 1957 Jewish farmers were producing 94i of the country 1 s 
gross vegetable crop, -mostly on unirrigated so i1.57 The most 
profitable veg e table crops were tomatoes, potatoes, ground-
nuts, cucumbers, onions 1 carrots , cauliflower, cabbage, beet-
root, peppers, spring onio ns, beans, maize, eggplant, and art-
ichoke s . 
Fruit growing was the only branch of Israel 's agricul-
ture that did not increase its production in the ea rl y years 
of the state . Fruit growing is one of the most expensive 
bra nch es of agr iculture, requiring substantial capital and 
labor investm e nts over a period of years before any return is 
harvest e d. Plans for fruit cultivation during the state's 
firs t few years included the r e clamation of orcha rd s that had 
been destroyed in the wa r and the planting of new orchards. 
Fruit growing was undertaken by e stablished settlements who 
could afford th e initial reha bi l i tation investment and wait 
for the harvest retur n in the coming seasons. For these very 
r e asons div ers ificatio n in this branch of agriculture was 
more important than in any other branch. The cultivation of 
fruit orchards consists of high quality early and late var-
ieties to ensure an ample supply for local demand and for 
export, and was planned to exist only as an auxillary crop 
for the primary specialized farm types. 
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Fruits cultivated in Israel consisted of indiginous stone 
fruits of oliv es, dates, plums, and figs. This list expanded 
to include orchards of apples, melons, bananas, table and wine 
grapes, avacados, and most recently, persimmons, loquats, 
guava, mangos, and pineapples. By the beginning of the 1970s 
t he cultivation of vegetables and fruit had expanded to the 
total cuitivated area and yields r e flected in the table on 
p age ninety. 
FRUIT YIELDS DURING THE PERIOD 1948/49 - 1953/54 
SELECTED YEARS 
(tons) 
Vari~tz. 1948/ 49 1950/51 J.15J/g ~3/54 
All varieties 28,900 24,330 36,930 55,300 
Table grapes 9,000 5,600 8,800 14,400 
Wine grapes 7,200 6,250 8,000 12,600 
Olives 3,800 950 3,050 5,200 
Bananas 3,500 5,680 8, 180 11,300 
Deciduous fruits 4,700 3,250 6,100 9,300 
Miscellaneous 780 2,600 2,800 2,500 
Source: Haim Halperin, Changing Patterns in Israel_.8..9Iiculture. p. 148 
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CULTIVATED AREA AND PRODUCTION OF VEGETABLES AND ORCHARDS 
(1970-71) 
Area in 1 , 000 Production in C ro_Q_ (dunams) ( tonsJ 
Vegetables 
Tota l 277 765 
Pota to es 55 142 
Tomat oes 50 141 
Cucumbers 30 38 
Car r ots 14 31 
Onion s 19 29 
Eggplant s 9 15 
Mar rows 10 11 
Peppe rs & Gambas 17 26 
Cabbage & Caul i fl ov,er 15 12 
Artichokes 10 5 
Orchards 
Total 855 
Citrus 426 1513 
Grapes 100 67 
Stone Fruit 92 147 
01 i ve s 103 13 
Bananas 19 56 
Subtropi ca 1 Fruits 31 23 
Nuts 31 3 
Source: Bank of Israel, Econom,l'.'_, p. 168. 
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1,000 
AREA ND YIELDS OF VEGETABLE CULTIVATION 
12_48/49. 1949Jso_;. 19$0/sr _ .JJ.§JJir 19$2/53 " ]1§_3JM 
Area (dunams) 69,000 
Yield (t ons) 96,500 
133,000 157, 000 198,000 244,000 269,000 
135,500 157,500 202,000 235,000 258,000 
Source: Hai m Ha 1 peri n , Ch_a_I1..9 in g Pat t~_r~i _n_ ~a~J _ Ao r:-.JSY. lt ure, r. 145 
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Comprehensive Regional Planning in Israel 
The transition from mixed to specialized farming, and 
particularily the introduction of the field crop farm brought 
forth revolutionary concepts in both agricultural output and 
patterns of settlement. Specialized farming was based on the 
concept of comparative advantage, the chobce of a farm type 
being determined by national needs and the resources and eco-
nomic advantages of th e particular area. The dairy farm type 
was established in districts near towns with central milk re-
frtgeration, storage, and processing plants to provide for 
the immediate distribution demands of milk producers and con-
sumers. The citrus farm type was established in areas of 
moderate climate and rainfall, with a rich, loamy soil. In 
the typical citrus b e lt, regional packing houses and grading 
plants were built. Industrial field crops came to be estab-
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lished in the northwestern Nege½ where climatic and soil con-
ditions favored the cultivation of cotton, sugar beets, tobacco, 
and groundnuts . Industrial field crops introduced the need 
for industry's presence in rural areas. Cotton gins and mills, 
sugar refineries, tobacco processing plants, groundnut grading, 
and potato cold storage plants were constructed near the area 
of the particular crop's cultivation in order to make rational 
marketing and processing possible and to reduce production costs. 
The general change in Israel's agricultural economy toward 
increased specializ ation was speeded by many factors. The 
rapid influx of new agricultural settlements led to solving 
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problems of surpluses in some commodities and alleviating short-
ages in other areas. The increasing concern over the foreign 
payments gap, the national security situation. (necessitating 
a stable and efficient economy} the natural variations in cli-
mate and soil types all allowed specialized farm types to lower 
their costs and increase their competitiveness in both domestic 
and worldwide markets. 
The planning principles for specialized farming in Israel . 
involved no radical ideological changes. Resources were still 
allocated to guarantee an equal income opportunity to a ll 
farmers. Whether th e farm was in the hills, on the coast a l 
plain, or in the desert, there was to be no significant dif-
ference in a farmer's contracted average income. _ Specialized 
farms were planned to engage in few enterprises to allow a 
farmer and his family to work the land without the use of hired 
labor. Since the majority of his income was to come from a 
single crop, planning also included a system of crop in s urance 
as th e farmer was increasingly vulnerable to climatic and other 
natural calamaties. Yield insurance--the established practice 
of g uaranteeing the farmer that a particular quota of his 
produced output would result in income, be it from the market-
place or government subsidies--became the widely accepted method 
of crop insurance. 
Specialized farms had to be established and maintained on 
a regional basis in order to take full advantage of an area's 
resources, and to obtain the desired large scale of operation. 
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Before 1954 region al planning had existed only in isolated 
instances. Ventures in regional cooperation were created in 
atbempts to reclaim the land and to provide joint services 
for the settlements tha~· left to each settlement's sole 
resources, would have been economically unfeasible. 58 Each 
settlement had remained independent of one another regarding 
production decisions. A new concept of comprehensive regional 
planning was made necessary by specialization, ~·and a larger 
scale of production operations was based on the mutual inter-
dependence of various settlements, not on their mere coop-
eration. 
The Lakhish Region Development Project, initiated in 1954, 
marked a turning point in rural and regional development. The 
Lakhish Region was the first comprehensively planned region in 
Israel. The decision to settle this region was, as most de-
cisions faced by the settlement authorities, forc e d by the im-
mediate demands of ea rl y Israeli statehood. Th e large number 
of immigr an ts, nati onwide sh ortage s in industrial crops, and 
desire to overcom e the balance of payments deficit by increas-
ing agricultural production led the Settlement Department of 
the Jewish Agency to undertake a comprehensive regional develop-
ment plan. The d ec ision of where to locate such a project was 
answered by the fact that the Lakhish region was virtually un-
occupied, and that in the absence of settlement, it had become 
a corridor for Arab infiltration and smuggling between Jordan 
and the Gaza Strip. 
INTEGRATED NATIONAL WATER DISTRIBUTION 
SYSTEM 
MILES 
0 25' 
\\\111 I Israel's 1948-1967 borders 
The Yarkon/Negev Pipeline, or National Water Carrier, was con-
structed between 1954 and 1964. Hater froQ northern sources, primarily 
the Sea of Galilee and Yarkon Riverr is pumped southward to the Negev 
Desert area. Cempletion of the pipeline was essential prior to full 
development of southern Israel. Feasibility and expansion of the 
pipeline is limited predominantly by the financia l constraints of 
pumping the water from its low elevation source to its higher elevation 
destination. 
ISRAEL 
,_ , 
. ' 
·-;.-. 
The colored area 
encompasses th e boun-
daries of the Lakhish 
Development Region. 
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The Lakhish Region was planned with a total of 900,000 
dunams, but by 1970 had expanded to encompass 1,100,000 dunams . 
The coastal strip, around the area of Ashquelon, is a continu-
a tion of the citrus belt and is suitable for most types of 
in tensive irrigat ed agricul tur e. The area exte nds east, through 
rich and heavy soil suitable for irrigation, into the Judean 
Hills where the land is hilly, eroded, and where little rain-
fall for irrigation ex ists. The construct ion of the Yarkon/ 
Negev pipeline, started in 1954, brought water which permitted 
more intensive irrigation than the dry farming methods prac-
ticed by the few farmers in the western areas. 
The concepts adhered to in the development of the Lakhish 
Region were a continuation and c ulmination of previous po l -
icies to ward agricultural settlements. Regional settl eme nt 
was an economic ne c essity , but the need for social i nt egration 
was ju st as acute , and once again took precedence over strictly 
economic concerns in the minds of planners . The policies fol-
lo wed by r egional plan ners were formul a ted a lon g the following 
lin es of rati onal reasoni ng and social goa ls:59 
1) Th e whol e r egio n was n ati onal land available for close 
settlement. 
2) The d eci si on to undertake specialized farming had been 
made by polic y -make rs in the Settl e ment Authority and Min-
istry of Agri culture. 
3) The breakdown of the mixed farming concept led to the 
breakdown of the idea that each vill ag e should be a clos ed 
socio-economi c unit. 
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4) The main economic base of the new region was industrial 
crops, which demanded a large scale of operation, heavy mech-
anization, and special marketing organization in the frame-
work of smallholder cooperatives (moshavim). 
5) It was necessary to base the settlement pattern mainly 
on the moshavim to meet the social demands of the new immi-
grants. 
6) It was necessary to settle each village with only one 
ethnic group to avoid culture clashes and at the same time 
enable group integration to prevent isolationism in the villages. 
7) The equal income principle, including the obligation to 
provide educational services of urban standards, had to be 
implemented. 
8) It was necessary to provide a suitable community frame-
work for non-agricultural personnel to encourage them to live 
in the region. 
9) It was necessary to process the agricultural products 
locally to keep the income originating from the industrial 
crops within the region. 
Three major problems in the human sphere had to be over-
come if the project was to succeed. The first was the problem 
of training new immigrants from traditional societies to become 
modern farmers in a complex farm economy within a short period 
of time. The second was the need to overcome the cultural 
barrier between the veteran population and the new immigrants 
and among the various ethnic immigrant groups themselves. The 
third problem was that of attracting qualified and educated 
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technicians and experts to live in the area to accelerate its 
rate of development. Confronted -~i~li \ these goals and problems 
of a regional nature, the settlement authorities thought it 
only reasonable to promote rapid regional development of the 
area through a comprehensively planned system. 6 0 
The Lakhish Region planners formulated a pattern termed 
"composite rural structure" as the basic physical framework 
for the region. The structure consisted of three levels of 
settlement; the farming village, the rural service center, and 
the rural town.61 From four to eight villages, each of about 
eighty families, were clustered around a rural service center. 
Such se:t:\Tj:c"e··-=::cent.ers-, . in turn, were clustered about a rural 
town. Rural service centers were not more than five kilometers 
away from each of the villages they serviced. Each village 
unit--b e it a moshav, kibbutz , or private village--contained 
only a core of essential services to settlers, such as grocery, 
kindergarten, small infirmary, and synagogue. All oth er ser-
vices, such as marketing, sorting and packing of produce, ag-
ricultural machin e ry stations, s chools , health services, and 
entertainment and cultural activities were concentrated within 
the rural service center. The service center also created the 
socio-economic conditions necessary to attract the qualified 
and skilled personnel necessary to the developing region. 
The composite rural structure was designed with each 
village to be settled by immigrants of a common cultural back-
ground. Cultural homogeneity provided an immigrant security 
by preserving the traditional ties among similar backgrounds, 
100 
and enabled them to establish their communities based on mutual 
aid and respect. Contact between ethnic groups of immigrants 
occurred at the rural service center. In th is manner, stabl e 
village units of agricultural production were established that 
created a rural community of common in terest and integration 
into I srae li society. 
Th e third level of the composite rural structur e-- th e rural 
town--became the region's industrial center. The to~n of Kiryat 
Gat became the location of major plants and factories for pro-
cessing the agricultural produce of the Lakhish Region. Kir-
yat Gat also contained all the administrative, economic, and 
cultural serv i ces for the enti re region which, because of econ-
omies of scale, could not be located in the rural cent ers . 
Kiryat Gat was integrated into its rural surroundings, since 
Kiryat Gat would have no basis for its industry without farm 
production, and without the industry of Kiryat Gat, farmers 
would hav e no market for t heir indus tr ial crops. 
Kir ya t Gat's industry developpe d both around and outside 
th e sphere of local agricu l tural production . Processing plants 
fo r loc al cotton, sugar, beets, groundnuts, flowers, and v e g-
etable production were esta blish ed , a s were auxill ia ry textile 
industri es not r e late d to agriculture. 
The basic units of agricultural production, the farming 
villages, were planned on the sam e principles which had here-
tofor e g uided rural planners. As most of the immigrants in 
the area were eastern J e ws, the moshav farm unit evolved into 
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the most popular form of settlement in the region. The physical 
layout for the moshavim of the Lakhish Region was planned dif-
ferently from earlier patterns of moshav settlement. As pre-
vi ously stated, moshavim had been planned as compact and largely 
self-contained villages consisting of family farms on a single 
plot of land. The labor-intense diversified structure of ir-
rigat ed mixed farming typical in the moshav had required close 
supervision of different farm branches. Short distances be-
tween a family's house, the out-buildings, and the farmland 
were required to achieve maximum efficiency in operation. Thus, 
family farms were laid out as onep~6t, adjoining another family's 
plot. 
The development and implementation of the field crop farm 
t ype in the Lakhish Region required a more intensive use of 
mechanical implements to cultivate the crops. Larger land 
units became a prerequisite for lowering production costs and 
ensuring profitability from mechanization. 62 Individual farm 
holdings were too small for large-scale mechanization, so a 
pattern developped which grouped individual plots under the 
same crop. The farmers' holdings now consisted of several 
small plots , none of which were adjacent to his house. Indi-
vidual plots under the same crop were laid out in la~9e blocks, 
~ . I 
enabling cooperative use of machinery , aerial spraying, and 
other use of modern farming techniques . 63 Together with the 
removal of many services previously provided by each moshav to 
the rural center, such multi-plot planning allowed for a much 
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mor e c ompact residential area in the moshav than had previously 
be e n known. 
Farm types in the Lakhish Region were determined by nat-
ural conditions and requirements of the national economy. The 
settlements that had been founded in th e region before 1954 
(primarily in the western areas) were mostly dairy and citrus 
farms; with family holdings of thirty dunams. Th e new set-
tlements were of the field crop farm type, with family holdings 
of from forty to fifty dunams. These field crop farms were 
planned to be eventually entirely irrigated, the water to be 
sup p li e d by th e pro p os e d national pip e line from th e Jordan and 
Yar kon Rivers. Cultivat e d crops in th e region consisted of 
industrial cro p s a nd v e g e tables. The majority of the irrigated 
are a has evel ve d p res e ntly to b e used for citrus cultivation 
and industrial crop s of cotton, sugar, beets, groundnuts, veg-
e tables, wheat, barl e y, hay, and fodd e r. 64 
Planning for the Lakhish Region began in 1954. After 
a thorough and careful survey of topographical, climatic, and 
soil conditions, and the most suitable crops for the agri-
cultural sector determined, a physical master plan was formu-
lated for the region and actual settlement began in the summer 
of 1955. In 1970 seventy-four farm settlements existed in 
the region; thirty-four moshavim, twenty-nine kibbutzim and 
moshavim shitufi, and eleven administered farms. These set-
tlements were divided by farm types into eighteen dairy farms, 
twenty-three field crop farms, three orchards, four extensive 
pastures, and the nine administered farms. As planned, irrigat~~ . 
field crops have emerged as the dominant cultivated crop in 
the Lakhish region. In the 1967-68 harvest serson, irrigated 
field crops of industrial crops and vegetables accounted for 
fully 50% of the total value added for farm production in the 
region. Citrus and wine plan tations produced about 29% of 
the total value added farming of the region, and livestock 
provided 21% of the total value added. 65 
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When the Lakhish project was initiated, it provoked an 
active discussion in Israel because of the revolutionary nature 
of its physical layout and proposed crop production patterns 
in relat ion to existing s e ttlement ideology. Many of the "rev ~ 
olutionary" ideas of 1954 , such as inter-village cooperation 
based on the composite rural structure, the separation of farm 
lands from the home, and a farm system not based on animal hus-
bandry, but on field crops, became fully accepted. Further-
more, the concept of the composite rural structure developped 
for the Lakhish Region has been used as a model for all further 
regional development. 
Composite rural str uct ure planning was a successful solu-
tion to the dilemna created by the introduction of industrial 
field crops and the desir e to integrate their production and 
processing in the same community. A developped economy is 
marked by its industrialization. A solid and highly efficient 
agricultural base which provides for a society's needs allows 
that society to expand its demand of non-foodstuff products . 
Only then can the industrial sector hope to expand and succeed. 
A viable and modern world economy could not hope to exist if 
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its major efforts and resources remained devoted toward agri-
culture. 
Zionist policy-makers in Israel's early years were well 
aware of these realities and succeeded in achieving the proper 
combination of maintaining their idealism and dealing with 
reality. Zionist ideology of labor on the soil did not have 
to abandon itself to the reality of industrialization; it 
merely had to expand to accomodate it. Thataccomodation was 
made possible by the regional planning of agricultural/indus-
trial linked developments in new rural settlements. Without 
a policy of population dispersal and comprehensive region 
building in Israel, economic growth would have become top-heavy 
in the cities, and rural development would have been stifled 
by the mass exit of rural settlers to the economically advantag-
eous cities. Because Israel's problem was one of new settle-
ments rather than modernizing old farming regions, many areas 
that became settled and integrated would not have been able to 
do so without a policy of comprehensive regional planning. 
Without the stimulation of industry and service centers, ag-
ricultural methods themselves would likely not have advanced 
as rapidly as they did. The enlarged local markets of a reg-
ional community encouraged a farmer to produce more than the 
subsistence amount he required for his own use while transport 
and marketing systems were developing which would expand the 
farmer's total market. The value added to a rural region's 
raw cultivated materials by local industrial development kept 
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much of the region's income circulating in the same area, 
rather than experiencing an income drain from outside buying 
interests. This led directly to an increase in farmers' in-
come and purchasing power and kept the gap between town and 
country at a minimum. 
Rural industries introduced to Israeli rural development 
can be divided into three categories. Processing industries 
are located within the producing area and eliminate the inter-
mediate stages between farm and factory, and also reduce trans-
portation costs; thereby increasing the farmers' share in the 
added value increase of his own produce. Linked industries 
fill employment gaps in the slack seasons for agricultural 
production and allow the farmer to discard unprofitable branches 
previously maintained to balance the yearly work schedule. For 
example, in northern Israel the soil and climatic conditions 
are favorable for the growing of tobacco, which has a slack 
season between October and February. An industrial plant was 
established in the northern town of Kiryat Schmona to sort, 
grade, and ferment the tobacco leaves. This provided a more 
rational economic alternative than the less profitable culti-
vation of early spring vegetables that had previously been 
used to balance the annual work schedule.66 Auxiliary 
industries having no specific connections with local conditions 
were the final category of industry intr6duced to rural areas. 
By far the greatest industry of this sort came to be ~e x tile 
factories. The purpose of these factories was primarily to 
absorb surplus manpower that could not be gainfully employed 
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in a region's ag ri cultural act i vities. 
Industry had developped to play a central role in rural 
Israeli life, both on a regional scale and within individual 
settlements. Many kibbu tzim have established industries for 
the same reason regional industries evolved; to balance the 
work schedule, employ surplus manpower, and enhance the over-
all income of the kibbutz. In the late 1950s kibbutzim ex-
perienced an "industrial revolution." This revolution trans-
formed kibbutzim from predominantly farming communities into 
settlements in which manufacturing is a major branch and pri-
mary source of income. In the early 1970's about 30% of 
kibbutz labor was employed in production branches.6 7 Manu-
facturing a ctivities expanded from those associated with ag-
ricultural production to highly technical fields of plastics 
and e lectronics. 
The unifying thread among a ll Jewish immi gran t s and act -
ivities in Israel, past and prese nt, revolving aro und land 
settlement and development patterns is the id ea l of Zionism . 
Zionism was born from the rising wave of Jewish nat ionalism 
at th e end o f the nineteenth century and urged all J ews to 
return to, and rebuild the land of their Biblical ancestry. 
"To build th e land and so be r eb uilt by the land" was the 
belief of every Zionist Jew making has way back to his homeland. 
Each wave of settlement in Israel has been dealt with on 
the basis of lessons learn e d from previous waves. In the late 
nineteenth and earl y twentieth centuries, handfulls of eager 
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and idealistic pioneers arrived in Palestine to begin reclaiming 
the land. Harsh physical conditions and high capital require-
ments made the early pioneers soon realize that idealism alone 
would not ensure the success of their pursuits on the land. 
Sturggling Jewish agricultural communities turned to Baron 
Edmund Rothschild for financial backing in 1884 and for the 
next fifteen years J~wi~h ' agriculture existed in a state of 
paternalism. The economic success of the settlements was ach-
ieved with Rothschild's aid, but success in achieving Zionist 
goals of self-sufficiency and non-exploitative labor on the 
soil was not possible under his domination. The Palestine 
Independent Colonization Association took control of Baron 
Rothschi ld's holdings in 1898 and colonists had a greater 
degree of control in their agricultural pursuits, but it was 
not until the World Zionist Organization created the Jewish 
National Fund in 1901 that agricultural settlements were 
established on the basis of, and in order to achieve Zionist 
ideals. 
Ideals that formed the basis of all Zionist policies re-
garding land settlement and development leading ultimately to 
the creation of a Jewish state centered around the land itself. 
All landholding was of a public nature, thus land could best 
be used to further national rather than personal Jewish inter-
ests, and the land could not be fragmented and sold; slowly 
slipping from Jewish possession. Every man was to cultivate 
an area of land without the use of hired labor, no man was to 
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be exploited by producing for another man's economic gain. 
Each producer was to be self-sufficient as much as possible, 
and cooperation was to be based on mutual need and benefit 
rather than a forced dependency. Finally, Zionist policy 
sought to insure each farmer an income equal to that of his 
urban counterpart in order that rural workers not be drawn to 
urban areas, creating a top-heavy urban society. The Zionist 
Jewish state was to be a fully modern nation based on the 
e fforts of self-sufficient workers on the land. 
Zionist ideals of communal living and each man's labor 
contr i buting to the r e juvination of the land were realized 
in communal kibbutzim settl ements. Kibbutzim were establi s he d 
as large single product.ion and single consumption units, and 
members were motivated by fervent Zionist ideals rather than 
material incentives of personal gain. Moshavim settlem e nts 
joined kibbutzim in 1921 to integrate the changing needs of 
Jewish immigrants with Zionist ideals of building the Jewish 
nation. Moshavim operated as .individual production and con-
sumption units that cooperated with one another in areas of 
initial land clearing and development, capital investments, 
equipment, harvesting and marketing of produce. 
A system of mixed farming was continued and expanded in 
Zionist settlements to provide the desired balanced labor sch-
edule, full employment, and self-sufficiency. The need for 
Jewish agriculture to become self-sufficient was made even 
more imminent by restrictive British policies of the Mandate 
period. British policies severely limited Jewish immigration 
I 
( 
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into Palestine and agricultural trade to and from the country. 
Pa l es tin ia n citrus was the primary source of exported agricul-
tural produce, but full development of this and all other export 
markets were limited by British dictates on world-wide trading 
activities. The ci trus industry sufferred greater setbacks 
than mixed farms from both world wars because citrus profita-
bility was so dependent on forei gn consumption. Palestinian 
Jews were painfully aware of their subjugation by the British. 
The ability of Jewish agriculture to provide for each settle-
ment's and the entire community's food needs was a necessary 
first step in becoming independent. 
Jewish agriculture in Palestine was faced with limitat io ns 
from every aspect of potential growth. Th e dilemna centered 
around getting an increas e d output from sharply limited in-
p uts that were in constant threat of getting even smaller. The 
availability of land was severely restricted and even the avail-
able land was largely undesirable without massive capital in-
vestments, which in turn, were sharpl y curtailed in their eco-
nomic feasibili t y. Avai labl e water for irrigation was , and 
co ntinu es to be the greatest restraint to full deve lopment of 
the l a nd's pote ntial. In 1948 less than 20 % of the cultivated 
land was irrigated. To this da y the Negev region remains 
largel y und eve lop pe d for agricultural purposes becaus e of the 
tremendous c ost of providing irrigation water. Manpower was 
a lso limited, both in absolute numbers and in th e level of its 
skill. Most of the Jewish immigrants entering Palestine were 
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eager to work on the land but had very little practical know-
ledge in reaping returns from the soil. 
In short, Jewish agriculture and the Jewish community in 
Palestine lack ed anything and everything that would ensure their 
survival. Everything, that is, but the stamina and persever-
ence to survive. Thus the Jewish community did survive, and 
transformed itself into the independent Jewish nation of Israel. 
Problems facing Is raeli agriculture centered not around restric-
tive government policies, but around creating new agricultural 
policies that would lead to the optimum growth of the new 
country's agricultural sector. A primary criterion for measur-
ing an optimum growth rate was that of integration. The agri-
cultural and industrial sectors were to be balanced such that 
growth in one sector did not occur at the expense of the other. 
Agricultural subsidies and crop yield insurance had to be 
implemented to equate agricultural wages with those in the in-
dustrial sector. Likewise, opportunities and services had to 
be made more equitable between rural and urban areas to keep 
the rural population from flocking to the cities. Israeli ag-
riculture had to be integrated into the world agricultural 
market. Production had to be just as efficient as foreign pro-
duction techniques and output had to be of as high a quality 
as output in already developed countries. Government policies 
could somewhat insulate the agricultural sector from competi-
tion for labor and capital inputs with the industrial sector, 
but outside the realm of the domestic economy, Israel's agri-
cultural sector had to be economically sound if it was to succeed. 
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Perhaps the greatest integration prob lem was that of integrating 
the country's population. Jews from war-torn Europe mixed with 
Amer ica n Jews, second generation Palestinian J ews, and oriental 
Jews from nor th ern Africa and the Middle East, and all had to 
blend into a new l y created society based on their mutual labor 
' 
on the land. 
By 1953 the Ministry of Agricu lture r eal i zed that continued 
emphasis on a system of mixed farming was not most benefitial 
for increasing the agricultura1 sector's profitability. Self-
sufficiency for the enti r e country and each agricultural pro-
ducing ente rpris e led to costly duplication of capital stock 
in each communit~ A nationa l surp lus of eggs, milk, and poultry 
products combined with the threat of gra in shortages and pre-
vented greater eco nomi es of scale and increased pro fita bility 
afforded by specialization. Specialization indeed l ed to a 
greater mutual interdep ende nce among food producing units within 
the entir e nation, but it marked an essential step forw ard in 
Isra e l' s agricultural deve l opmen t. 
Sp ecia lized farm producing units were classified as either 
dairy farms, citrus farms, export (primarily vegetable) f ar ms, 
and field crop farms. Marketing board s were established to 
integrat e cooperative marketing of agricultural produce and 
furth e r government minimum price guarantees insured success in 
the initial transitional harves t seasons for each of the farm 
typ es . Th e field crop farm was the most radical introduction 
to Israeli agriculture to date. Never before had industrial 
crops such as cot t o n, sugar beets, tobacco, and green fodder 
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been grown in this area as primary profit crops. 
Industrial field crops called for a greater degree of reg-
ional integration and planning in new and existing agricultural 
settlements. Costs and benefits of mechanization, and highly 
technological farming practices were spread over an entire 
geographic agricultural region. Comprehensive regional planning 
also satisfied the national objective of integrating the popu-
lation between rural and urban sectors, preventing a top-heavy 
urban sector. Regional planning insured that incomes, services, 
and social and educational opportunities in the rural sector 
would be more equal to their counterparts in the urban sector 
than if no system of planned integration existed. Such reasoning 
led to the introduction of industry into rural areas. Local 
industries were initially established around local agricultural 
produce which served to employ excess manpower, circulate lo-
cally-produced income within the area, and generally enhance an 
area's economic viability. 
Israel has achieved her goal of becoming a fully integrated 
and modern world economy, and agricultural concerns are now 
those of a developped rather than developing economy. The ma-
jor crisis facing the agricultural sector and the remainder of 
the economy in the 1970s and 1980s is that of inflation. In 
1979 the annual inflation rate was over 100 percent. In part , 
this inflation was built into the very system that led to Israel's 
rapid expansion. Government policies such as income guaran-
tees , crop yield insurance, and price subsidies stimulated demand 
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which stimulated production which stimulated high rates of 
agricultural growth in the first critical decades of national 
development. Israel lacked everything leading to rapid and 
integratecl growth, but most importantly, she lacked time. 
Policies and planning decisions had to be made and acted upon 
rationally, but expediently. To a large extent, the potential 
for long-range problems was accepted as a cost of facing and 
solving immediate problems. Israel's rate of rapid growth 
directly led to the present inflationary problems. The primary 
issue now centers around controlling excessively high national 
demand without restricting production to the point of high 
unemployment combined with below capacity production levels. 
Zionist settlements face the additional problem of 
maintaining their ideological objectives while faced with such 
serious inflationary pressures and a relatively high standard 
of living . Jewish labor on the soil has rebuilt the Jewish 
nation. No longer is self-sacrifice necessary to abhieve a 
dream. The Zionist dream has been realized, and as a whole, 
Zionist agricultural settlements no longer have to struggle 
f or their survival and economic viability. Kibbutzim and mosh-
avim are profitable ventures but are faced with the problem of 
perpetuating ideals of non-exploitation and communal consump-
tion, production, and decisions in the wake of increasing lux-
ury and sedation. 
The domestic hardship of inflation and the external threat 
of hostile surrounding nations serve to sustain adherence to 
Zionist ideals to an extent. Development of the agricultural 
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sector has fulfilled its goals of integrating the rural and 
urban sectors and creating a modern economy rooted in an ag-
ricultural foundation. The greatest strength of Israeli ag-
ricultural policy is its ability to shift to accomodate the 
ever-changing needs and realities of Israeli society. This 
flexibility is made possible by the essentially unchanging 
Zionist vision of a Jewish nation based on J ewish labor on 
the soil. So long as this ultimate goal is achieved, other 
specific and particular aspects of agricultural policy are 
but a means to achieve the end. 
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POPULATION 
(millions) 
AREA 
(square 
millions) 
GNP per capita 
(money) 
GNP 
agriculture 
( % ) 
GNP 
industry and 
manufacturing 
( % ) 
LABOR FORCE 
agriculture 
( % ) 
.• , 
·:., · 
UNITED STATES 
(1960) 
221. 9 
9,363 
9,590 
1960 1978 
--
--
4 3 
67 58 
7 2 
U .S .S.R. 
(1962) 
261. 0 
22,402 
3,700 
1960 1978 
-- --
21 17 
114 114 
42 17 
ISRAEL 
(1961) 
3. 7 
21 
3,500 
1960 1978 
-- --
11 7 
55 63 
14 7 
Source: World Development Report 1980 
The World Bank Washington, D.C. August, 1980 
EGYPT 
(1960) 
39.9 
1,001 
390 
1960 1978 
--
--
30 29 
44 55 
58 51 
JORDAN 
(1961) 
3. 0 
98 
1,050 
1960 1978 
-- --
11 
45 
44 27 
I-' 
I-' 
lJl 
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LA.110 UNDER CULTIVATION IN ISRAEL 
( thousand dunams) 
Total ~-·~:Under·, Irrigation 
l ()4 2- 1%9- 19 71- 194 8- l<J69- 1971-
1 ()11, () 1 () if) 1972 1949 1 C) 7() 1<172 
--
Field Crops 
A 11 Farming 1094 2685 2735 66 637 642 
,Jewish Farr:1ing 887 2153 2180 634 
Ve0et;i.~l~s and Melons 
-A 11 Farming 106 346 305 53 262 300 
Jewish Farrntng 66 267 301 263 
Fruit Tree Plantations 
All Farrni ng 355 ffi 5 865 1501) 678 694 
Jei,.Jish Farr.,ing 2 75 725 735 684 
Fish Ponds 
I\ 11 Fanning 15 51 56 15 i:;t.1 :16 
Jewish Fanning 15 54 56 l 5 54 56 
Miscellaneous 
A 11 Farming 8') 1 m 184 16 96 98 
Je1..,,ish Farr.ii ng 75 1'15 15 8 g7 
Total 
All Faming l f;5() 412() 4145 300 1727 179 0 
Jewish Farming 1 311) 3354 3430 l 6f;l l 734 
Source: David Horowitz (ed.), Econor.iy. 
All Faming 
Arab Farming 
Arab ~~ of Total 
Field Crops 
Vegetables 
Citrus 
Other Fruit 
Milk 
E0gs 
Meat 
Mi see l la neou s 
total 
Source: Econor.iy 
J OLl, 8 
.. 44 A 
2.8 
6.2 
ISRAEL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE 
1Cl48-l970 
l <)'.lg 1()54 19 59 1962 
56 .3 3()7.4 74!). 5 1161 
5 . l ?.4 . 2 40.6 58.3 . 
9.0 7.9 5.3 5. l 
ARAB AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE 
1970-71 -
Millions of 
Israeli Pounds 
21. 7 
31. 7 
5.6 
15. 7 
1 3J) 
l. 3 
2 3. f1 
4 . l 
llfi. 7 
1964 19 66 
--
1355 162 3 
78. 7 129.5 
5.8 
Percent 
of Tota 1 
1 s. n 
2 7 .2 
!J..8 
13. 5 
11 . 1 
1 . 1 
2f"J . ? 
3_c; 
8.'.) 
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1970 
2509. 9 
116. 7 
4.6 
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THE ISRAELI AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN THE LAST DECADE 
1970 . ··_197 3, 1975 1979 
Total Work Force (million.) ; 
'· l 1 1.13 1. 2 
,· 
Percent in Agriculture 10. 5% , 8% 6. 5% 5.8% 
Total GNP (billion) $5.3 $8.7 $12 $12 .5 
Percent From Agriculture 9% 8% 6. 5% 6.7 % 
Total Exports (billion) $1.4 $1.8 $2.9 
Percent of Agricultural Exports 20% 13% .15% 13% 
·-
Value of Agricultural Exports (million) $278 $386 
Land devoted •roward Agriculture 20% 20% 20% 20% 
Utilized Water Resources 95% 100% 
Source: Depar tment of State, Background Notes, publications for 
respective years. 
KIBBUTZIM AND MOSHAVIM POPULATIONS 
IN ISRAEL'S FIRST DECADE 
1948 1954 
Total Kibbutz Population 43,258 71,569 
Percent of Total Population 7.1% 4.9% 
Total Moshavim Population 18,268 74,533 
Percent of Total Population 3.0% 4. 7% 
Source: Baim Halperin, Changing Patterns in Israel Agriculture 
POPULATIONS OF KIBBUTZIM AND MOSHAVIM (1977) 
Moshavim 
Kibbutzim 
Settlements 
376 
235 
Inhabitants 
134,300 
102,654 
Percent of 
Total Population 
4.3% 
3.3% 
Source: The New Standard Jewish Encyc lop e di a , 1977 
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6.8 25.0 55.3 129.1 12. 
6.9 25.9 57.0 141.8. 13. 
6.5 26.8 59.0 146.6 14. 
6.5 27.3 o0.4 152. 7 I 5. 
7.0 27.8 6 l.5 144.2 ~6. 
7.6 19.0 68.0 152.2 16. 
7.6 !9.0 75.0 166.2 17. 
7.4 19.0 81.0 179.7 IS. 
7.8 19.0 90.9 190.1 '19. 
8.0 19.0 97.3 189.1 '19. 
8.5 19.b 98.J 189.'I '21. 
~~""'-="-,s/J~ •-·---·-1-~"•"-> ... , . "' _ _.--, .. ' -~~---=-<T_-..--.a-a,,,~~-·~ ---
. . . .... 
-
- . 
.. 
--·----------·fl 
I 1 
Emp!oyed in 
Cultivated area (thou1and dunam\) ~ 
aaricu1ture I \ 
(thousands) £) .,, 
I? ; 
~ •m-l I ' ff C >-~ ,m;,,• :'nl:I r. .. ~ ~;V 
'ITllln ,,~J) 
r $ i I) ::, • 
" § 
~] .g ,C'l'PO m:mt nt:l:I 
-
:nm ~1"0 ~~~ n,:,,,::i 1<7'1 :w;,m (.-u:,;,:, f !:tm 
tl"i".:l:I ',:,:, 10 J: 5 r:.. .. ;J D'l'T 0"'1-r.1 i::rr,-r., Veetla· Field ~ ,~,i:i . Jll :, C • . Tbwcof: Total' g ~ ... 8 f Fish Fruit Citrus blcs, crol)1 n--eor: Total . 
J:] 0 planta- (incl. irripted ' : -plo)oees ponds potatoes. 
~] i tions, melons ' are=< exci. acd in , ~ l ._ f~ a ,!! ciLrus pump- prcpara- ., ' .. , ; 
.. \. ..... f, . . kins lion)~ (0 ;. 
.. .. . 53 80 15 230 125 ]06 1,094 300 1,650 r-- 1 
~.' 
. .. .. 69 94 22 245 132 190 1,798 l7S 2,480 -· 
.. 107 '106 27 259 133 189 2.636 470 3,3.SO f,.. ' .. /-1 ,, 
.. 
-
.133 111 30 27~ !35. . 248 2.676 540 l.475, '(!). 
-. ,111· ·, 
.. . . 148 124 - 35 294 139 . 308 2.650 ,so 3.550 '1-!':1 
. . , 1<1l~ 
~ .. 163 135 35 31 I 164·., 279 2.636 760 3.560 1-:1 ~ 
. 
.. l&.O -IOU · 19S 143 · 37. 320 :195 263 2.633 890 l..590 h-4 ,;, 
~- f:~ 36.7 100.8 222 . 147 - 40 323 213 ·1g·1 2,681 9S6 3.615 
41.6 104.2 231 149 41 35:Z 246 279 2.753 I.JOO 
3.820. 
' 
IIS.I 252 159 43 370 275 279 2.823 1.185 3,940 
4 
41.3 • 
44.8 . 110.4 279 155 46 385 JOO 282 2.942 1.240 4.110 
( 
t 
'.«..O '121.1 299 159 49 394 328 264 2.882 1.305 4.075 
no 127.6 J26 162 53 . 413 34-0 267 2.915 1.360 4.150 1-t 
46.S 125.9 
-
347 165 ... .S6 . - 417 370 287 2.745 1,426 ·4.040 -I C 
'45.4 !112.6 367 170 58 422 385 304 2.631 1.472 3.970 { I 
"' 
49-i( 109.9 394 175 59 429 402 303 2,739 1.462 4.107 ~ 
-
( 
45.6 114.4 417 174 ., 61 425 410 301 2.759 . l.510 4.130 ,J 
·. 
40.4 ... 107.4 440 ,.174' 60 426 416 308 2.648 1.542 4.032 • 
39.3 104.1 462 . 174 59 431 418 307 2.749 1.588 4.138 r 
'32.5 '94.3 496 117 57 434 418 321 2.729 1.616 4.136 
--· 
30,<l Ql.3 522 178 55 433 420 342 2,71)4 l.662 4.132 
'Jl.3 "89.8 534 180 54 420 420 346 2,685 1.720 4.105 , 
34.3 92.0 S48 184 56 415 420 370 2,695 1.720 4,140 
38.0 95.6 559 183 56 419 -426 396 2,685 1.765 . 4.16.S 
-
36.5 93.l 573 187 5f 425 421 354 2. 712 1.760 .4.170 I 
J2.6 . 83.9 584 189 56 ,4JO 420 376 2.779 1.755 4,270 
27. l 80.4 596 191 5 I ,(36 425 368 2.854 1.800 4.325 
26.J 82.4 608 193 5 I J392 430 339 2,845 l_.835 IS.250 
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Agricultural year. unl~s othc-rwisc stated 
Production of main producu (t.houund tons, unla.a othcn>-isc ,atcd) 
n 
" 
cE ?- ii • ~ a ~ ~ ,;:. .,.. ,: g_ a ~ ~ 
~= ~e n J r: C: £_ Q g f! n r i nj fl ... n £_!! r .,. ?-- 01 , = 1! J! 
' 8 i 
.. l i !; I ~1 b~ u ~ e 0 • . 
-9.II.I .,.. .,._-:- .. .. .,, ; a Iii 
"" 
r i C} .e ~ • 8 C: ~ u f! 0 0 8 > ~ ::C 
...... u ro ~ > 5 c! i . 8 :i ~ ... 0 
.. 
1948/49 3.5 242.S 78.8 0.5 2.0 .s.o .. 10.7 J.S 7.2 10.6 
1949/50 6.6 330.0 92.2 o . .s 1.9 7.4 .. 3.1 2.0 7.4 9.5 
1950/.51 '\ 8.9 391.5 103.3 0.6 2.2 ti .. 2.7 S.7 6.3 7.1 
19.51/.52 7.9 366 . .S 119.3 0.9 2.4 1.0 
-
14.S 8.2 8.0 11.S 
1952/SJ 7.6 369.2 128.1 1.2 2.8 8.C: .. 13.S 10.9 9 • .s·· 12.7 
1953/S.C 9.0 414.0 146.6 1.6 4.0 9.3 
-
21.S 11.3 12.6 17.S 
1954/55 11.0 503.5 159.0 4.5 6.2 16.3 
-
2.1 17.0 11.0 14.0 
19.5.5/.56 10.9 .SIO.O 17 l.S .S.3 7.9 23.2 
-
25.0 23.S 14.2 Jl.j 
1956/.57 11.4 630.0 184.0 6.3 9.4 22.2 .. 7.0 20.3 . 20 .6 22.9 
1957/58 )2.4 886.0 216 . .S 8.3 10.2 34.2 .. 17.9 27.5 21.6 26.3 
1958/59 13.2 1.027.0 259.5 10.5 18.9 40 .7 
-
8.0 31.6 26.1 31.7 
1959/60 13.9 1,114.0 277.3 10.6 25.1 4.S.7 0.2 6.8 3.U 21.6 31.1 
1960/61 14.7 1.290.0 283.5 II.I 22.7 54.6 0.8 20.8 44.1 26.7 36.6 
1961/62 16.4 1.273.0 316.0 11.7 22 . .S 66.4 1.2 4.8 49.2 30.4 42.1 
1962/63 16.4 1,113.0 297.0 11.9 31.1 67 .0 1.6 13.0 50.6 2.5.6 33.6 
1963/64 18.9 1,271.S 304.8 10.9 35.5 74 . .S 1.6 21.0 49.8 34.0 49 .3 
1964/65 19.3 1,296.0 322.6 11.8 30.9 74.0 1.4 10.5 44.0 34.2 46.1 
1965/66 22.6 1,233 ;0 348.6 12.3 28.2 81.9 2.J 10.9 .53.9 33.J 42.7 
1966/67 22.9 1,402.0 380.2 13.8 30.5 89.0 3..S 24.S .so.s 39.8 42 .2 
1967/68 24..S 1,224 .0 393.8 15.2 3.5.2 89.2 4.1 9.S 44.0 37.J 34.6 
1968/69 21.9 1,218.6 408.J 15.2 34.3 93 . .S .S.2 ll.1 53.0 «.8 35.6 
t969no 21.8 1.320.0 440 .5 15 . .S 35.6 101.7 4. 1 6.6 61.1 36.0 24.7 
1970/71 26.1 1,423.3 452.0 1.5.7 36.5 124.2 7.6 12..S .56.3 37.0 29.6 
1911n2 27.1 1,-404.7 47C>.0 17.4 33.7 142.1 11.7 27.0 41..5 48.3 33.1 
1972/73 26.5 1,389.8 .523 •.S 18.0 3.5.7 144.S 12.3 4.0 38.1 46 .9 31.0 
1973/74 22.7 1,461.7 .545.1 18.8 38.9 162..S 1.5.0 30.2 33.7 44 .4 30.2 
1t1-cn5 22.2 1,569.9 .582.2 20.2 37.1 171.9 17.1 4.9 Sl.2 43.J 32.2 
1,1.sn6 24.2 1.6 76.S 65.S.1 20.3 «.I 187.S 18.j 19.5 57.4 4.5.9 31.6 
1916n1 2•1..S 1,700 671.4 22.7 47.0 192.1 21.a I.I 61.7 40.6 29.4 
1977/78 24 . .S 1,789.9 669.9 22.6 39.8 196.S 24.2 3.5.0 53.7 ,2.1 33.6 
------ - --- -
l J1 e ,: 
.. ~ .,.. f:' 
r f 
a a 
] l . 
§ e 
0 iii .. 
y 
.S.2 
6.4 
3 . .5 
6.8 
6.0 : . 
ll.O .':-· 
I 
6.7 ~ 
II.I 
16.6 10.6 : 
19.5 19.S 
30.0 30.0 , 
10.6 26.9 
17.1 14.1 
21.7 49.9 
15.6 .52.3 
31.8 72.8 
21 • .S 73.2 
30 . .S 86.0 
43.3 9.S • .S 
4.5.8 S3.8 
36.4 92.0 
40.7 98.6 
47.0 103.4 
60 .0 116 . .S 
47.J 123.2 
.51.8 106.2 
52.6 124.0 
.54.3 124.2 
45.0 136.S . 
50 .6 122. 7 
I 
i 
:/ 
I 
I,, 
1,.2 
.I, 
1.2 
1.5 
1.5 
"'r. 
. I. 
.I.S 
I.S 
'· 
1,4 
.. I 
Agricultural production 
0 C n (quantity index) n... 0 6- n D E ~ F ~ . ii .r- ~ C Ji ,.,._ 
·t 
. r IC C C b 0 p 1967/68 • 100 
C, 
.e r ;; p ~ r: P-. r n 
"" 
b 
" 
a. ~ E ~ P-&. .. f ,: t: ; ] ] I .F- n ~ ::i5 C: >. . a b .,.. ;: ~ ~ . C " j • C: ~ .:: !l 8 I >,, :, f: • ... a -; 0 • e .. g m 8 • ::c 0 :, 0 ~ "D ?S > "' 0 ti u ~ A. u ;), 
\ 
~ :.J 
!72. 7 13.0 26.0 80.0 40.6 0.3 
- -
20.2 21.2- 13 14 13 
l70.0 -46.2 3.5.3 125..S 53.2 0.8 - - 36.9 27.0 18 II 18 
I 152.6 13.7 37.0 14'2.0 .55.3 2.6 0 . .5 - 27.S 13.S 20 18 18 149.6 -41.0 46.3 17&.7 120.1 3.1 4 . .5 0.0 93.2 30.8 21 26 23 152.0 59.S .SS.4 203.0 110.1 8.1 8.2 0.0 64.0 29 . .S 22 28 2.5 :10.s 41.6 79.0 20.5.0 126.1 1.5.1 6.7 0.3 89.9 34.0 2.5 3.5 29 . 
,92.0 38.0 82.0 209.0 91.1 19.2 . 21.0 2.2 42.1 36.0 32 34 32 
I 
1.52.0 51.0 92.S 231.0 109.3 14.2 28.0 3.2 8.5.0 74.0 36 42 38 
139.0 69.0 93 .0 242.0 123.0 17.9 .56.0 4.1 74.2 83.0 40 47 42 
3.5.S 61.2 98.0 265.0 110.8 12.7 94 .0 4.9 53.3 62.5 53 47 49 
87.6 83.3 88.0 270.5 123.1 1.5.3 122.1 7.3 65.0 73.7 62 54 57 
09.6 52.0 81.8 296.2 78.5 17.0 244.9 10.7' 26.6 4J.3 66 5-4 .59 
1.5.7 70.J 8.S.0 277.1 109.4 14.S 221.0 14.S 62..S 6.5.9 73 61 66 
32.S 88.3 11f.o U0 . .5 103.6 12.4 221.0 16.1 48.2 .51.7 81 64 71 
36.4 93.3 103.9 296.9 109.1 13.0 249.9 13.4 36.3 S4.7 81 71 1.S 
3~.9 92.3 106.8 317.3 122.7 9.S 256.0 1.5.7 116.6 126.S ~ 82 84 
78.3 101.7 103.7 306.7 109.1 13.S 294.6 21..5 67.4 150.0 87 84 85 
06 • .S 83.8 103.8 3«.o 110.2 13.4 282.0 24.9 21.2 100.6 90 S-4 87 
82.0 92.0 93.4 342.-4 137.1 12.9 289.3 28 . .5 .56.0 221.6 100 99 99 
65.4 94.1 109.6 381..S ·113. 1 10.6 247.9 33.0 24 . .S 175.0 100 100 100 
78.1 119.9 I 14.6 443.0 139.9 12.4 214.7 39.2 20 . .S 1.55.8. 102 106 104 
61.9 131.S 137.1 472.3 137.3 18.7 237.0 3.5.3 13.6 12.5.0 109 110 109 
I.U 132.'; l-4.l..O 4°"M 141.2 21.2 258.6 36.7 17.6 199 . .S 120 123 121 
52.8 161.7 143.1 502.0 132.5 19.ll 248 . .5 40.3 32.8 .301.<C 127 136 131 
88.6 127.0 165. 1 .532.7. 126.8 14.6 217.3 37.4 17.9 24 l . .5 132 131 131 I 
98.0 124.0 1.52.4 496.2 138.0 18.0 116.7 49.8 . 30.2 274.0 ' 141 140 140 
06.0 134.8 163.0 609.2 14~.4 18.8 259.0 48.8 20.6 243 .3 148 150 149 
31.2 134.8 174.7 .581.1 140.1 23 . .5 323.6 .53.7 18.2 20.5 . .S 161 1.5.5 1.57 
28.1 130.0 214 .0 5'4.1 111.1 21 . .S 320 .0 64.0 16.6 220.0 165 164 164 
73.8 144.8 22 I. I 673.8 97.0 21..5 116. 7 79.2 s.o 169.0 ~65 176 171 
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Agricultural year . unles s otherwis.e stated 
Selcicted inpuu I £,.ports or~ l)roducts (lhous&Dd tona.. 
UD1aa otbcrwise atac.od) 7 
~ I 1 ,... i; .J 
~j - j ~ !- .... n _g hi ,, ii p L i ~ o. ,•=z f.!6 11 r Ii u= & ~J6 .. .. f'~ § Di; ,...3 ,... a n1 ...... & {! ~j ""li f·3 .,.. .... f ... li o.J i1 ~ ~1 ~ ~m .s e jl t --,-;- ! - p§ .. i 
·£~; f.:,11 f.""f! t! t-a I I f- :J C • fo ~ '5 ...., ... .CE I i -=-
1948/49 
- -
.. 257 .. 
- - ' 
1.4 ~ 
194W5u .. 
- -
332 .. .. .. - .. 
1950/51 .. 
- -
. 413 .. .. - - .. 
1951/52 .. 
- -
468 37.2 123.5 - - .. 
1952/53 .. .. 
-
563 36.5 184.0 
-
O.J .. 
1953/54 2.2 7.4 10.7 660 41.8 I.S0.2 
-
.S.4 
-
1954/55 2.6 9.2 9.8 760 64.1 215.2 .. 4.1 0.1 
195.S/56 2.8 12 • .S 12.0 130 68 . 1 232.3 
-
17.0 0 .0 
1956/57 2.5 13.8 11.3 130 77.7 297 .6 
-
17.3 0.0 
1957/58 2.0 14.7 14 . .S 1.000 106.8 283.9 0.4 179.3 0.0 
1958/59 2.0 14.6 IS.4 990 0.8 
.-
U0.2 0.1 127.4 412 .2 
1959/60 2.2 14.6 16.9 1,060 123.5 473.6 4.3 397.6 0.1 
1960/61 2.2 12.3 18.1 1,025 144.6 497 .8 20.6 358.7 o.o 
1961/62 2.2 13.0 20.5 1, 125 157.5 496.4 20.3 310.0 0.0 
1962/63 2.4 11.9 18.8 1,140 160.6 492.0 23.9 103.8 0.1 
1963/64 2.5 10.2 21,1 1,025 186.8 553.7 20.2 189.4 0. 1 
1964/65 3.0 11.2 22.8 1,095 183.9 57.1.2 22.9 198.6 0.2 
1965/66 4.4 12.0 24 .0 1.265 192.6 610.8 17.0 27A 0.8 
1966/67 4.7 10.6 27.4 1,11.S 214 .2 660 .0 31.4 163.3 0.7 
1967/68 6.4 JU 28.3 1.265 187.2 617.0 19.6 151.9 0.9 
1968/69 6.8 12.3 28.0 1.235 198.4 648.0 19.2 17.2 2. I 
1969/70 9.4 14.1 29.6 1.340 212.0 -721.4 20. 1 19J 5.2 
1970/71 10.8 14.5 32.0r 1.245 223.6 807.5 12.7 53.9 7.3 
1971/72 12.2 16.2 33 .2 1.27.S 240.1 845.3 I t.R U .6 8.7 
1972/7 3 13.6 16.3 34.0 1,295 259 .8 945.8 14.5 22.0 10.8 
1973/74 
,· 1.5 
15.1 30.5 1,160 278.1 1.030.6 22.2 15.0 10.6 
1974/75 .15.2 17.0 32.7 1,230 271.0 1.I02.4 I J.4 · 36;4 16.8 
1975/7 6 17.9 19.4 36.7 1.325 323 .4 1.122.9 29.5 99.6 18.8 
11976/77 18.5 18.7 37.5 I.JOO 321.8 1,120.3 24.9 163.5 31.0 
1977/78 21.9 19.8 38.8 .. 3 15.7 1.086 .1 111.8 213 .0 60.6 
Cale ndar year. 2 At end or year . 3 Bull .:alves for mea t from dairy herd are included 11,ith canle for- meal. 
Th" inJc, h not dcri\'ed from agricultural br an ch accounts: see introduction 10 chapter X - Pr ice-s. prices of outpu t anJ 
mput in agnculturc ~ Since 1969-'70. includes c:mplO)Cd persons from the Administered Territori es. 6 Throu11h 
I '#Ml t. I according to calendar year· an d since l ':16 I ,62 4u an1n1c:~ acc()(d1ng 10 attriculturaJ year and \'alue accordint "' 
~·.1k·nJa1 )car. t-cnilizcr )Car. begin ning on I VII; induJes compo,1. 
f - C: I r- • -:i ~ ,. n 
• n ~2 r: n c f I C ,. n " _,_ r • • Jil- c:: ~ g ;q r f11i. c f ~t ~ 
r t_g a a_g-a r rl~ -
J. • 6 " e ~ r: • 
-8 :; 0 1 • ~ ~. r ; r s -
; C ::;• f h • ~ I! - C n - ii 
,. i ~ i O :t • § i ] a 8 ~ 
< "l. :, : o I t l > o 
154.6 
167 .~ 
161.7 
0. 1 - . 146.6 
0.6 0.0 206.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0. 1 
I.I 0.0 304.9 0.1 0.2 0.0 4.1 
0.9 0 .0 264.2 0.3 
- 0.2 J .O 
1.3 0.0 293 .2 0.5 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.0 3.1 
1.0 0.0 307.4 0.3 0.0 0.1 3.9 0.0 26.8 
1.9 0.0 308.0 I.I 1.3 2.3 5.6 0.2 0.0 
2.0 0. 1 376.5 3.3 1.3 1.8 4.8 0.0 2 I.I 
6.1 0.7 398.0 J .7 3.7 4.4 6.4 0.3 8.0 
13.8 0.4 331.1 2.9 4.0 2.7 6 .8 0.0 20.3 
12.J - 349.2 1.7 13.7 6.4 
- 0.0 4.4 
14.8 - 504 .8 1.6 11.7 1.9 4.5 I. 7 
- 17.6 0. 1 454 .3 2.1 3.0 1.0 3.0 1.8 
16.8 0. 1 .526.6 0.8 8.2 1.3 4.1 8.0 
21.2 
-
581.9 0.9 9.'.! 4.4 5.h 8.5 
t5 .9 
.. 
0.l 664.6 1.3 4.3 6.3 5.2 10.5 u 
7.9 LS 737.9 1.9 8.2 15.2 5.8 8.0 
3.4 1.l. I 0.9 697 .5 18.8 5.0 · 24.5 6.5 21.0 
2.5 16.6 1.4 815 .7 28.0 9.9 43.5 9.8 14.0 12.0 
4.4 ID 2.5 '858.5 37.6 12.3 48 .6 11.6 15.0 10.0 
7.5 I 1.0 4.9 859 .0 48.2 13.2 51.8 11.0 I 7.5 15.0 
7.8 .U 4.8 776.9 36.5 211.3 60 .9 8.2 11.4 6.5 
l0 .6 4.8 10.0 818 .5 42 . 1 11.2 51. 7 10.7 26 .6 6.0 
IJ .4 8.7 8.5 926 .9 .53.2 11.2 65. 9 10.7 25.8 6.0 
15.0 11.5 9.7 955 .8 50 .5 23.0 78...5 12.8 32.2 5.5 
IIU 10.1 IO.l 921.6 47 .4 19.4 103.7 12.7 39 .0 5.0 
l' U IO.O 11.0 89R.O 62.6 20.8 118.7 I 1.7 52.0 10.6 
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Thousand dunams 
1977/78 
t'" 
0,~ 
~ 
Crop ..,,:or ... ', JD~ 
Non- Otha Jcwida Jcwiab ramu farms 1 
I 
.• 
1 TOTAL 6t5.t 143.1 
.S.59.J 9JJ Winur 
Uninipted 
lrripted 
SIUIIINI, 
J 
· 559.5 86.S 
u -
lnipted 
Unirr, 
Wheat 
Barley 
0 
Pulses 
Supr 
Peas 
Safflower 
H 
Gr1 
'. 
rota/ 
rain 
min& 
er 
tire 
Si1qc 
Green 
M •soee•acoaza 
Jrrig, 
Wheat 
Sus 
Peas 
H 
Si1ap 
G 
Pulses 
iltU 
ll1Ulll 
er 
IC()UI 
- 6.8 
46.4 49.7 
35.7 ll.8 
10.7 37.9 
Winter crops 
559.J 86..S 
260.2 .53.J 
230.8 10.8 
0.0 0.1 
7.1 1.4 
1.7 0.2 
0.1 0.0 
0.1 0.1 
9.0 18.0 
0.1 0.4 
0.0 2.2 
0.0 0.J 
0.4 0.1 
01) 6..8 
0.0 4.0 
0.0 J..S 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.2 
0.0 0.2 
0.0 o.g 
0.0 0.1 
-
E 
I! ·;; 6 • 
n~ 
,- C 
_a :i 
652.t 
435.J 
40(U 
JS.I 
216.J. 
51.9 
15&.6 
400.4 
204.8 
26.1 
0.6 
20.8 
0.1 
3.7 
30.4 
75.6 
4.2 
Jl.l 
04 
2.6 
35.l 
I.I 
6.6 
0.4 
1.4 
0.4 
24.6 
0.6 
.. 
--· 1 
I 
~-s ,-'ror, ,.-',;in n·',:,:, ',•rn 
'1:m 1t> 1976177 1969/70 p;: 1975/76 l974t7' 
,. Jl Total ,. Jl 
lJ ·-Cl 
1,141.0 l,5-41.t 2Ml.l 2,SCJ.4.7 1.,621.t 2,517.1 
5561) / ,644J J,796J l.8)4.J J,657.7 1,617.9 
SIS.2 1,561.6 1,643.3 1,734.J 1.697.2 1,716.9 
40.8 82.7 ISS.O 148.2 160.S 111.0 
.591.D 904.6 86).9 760.1 766.1 689.9 
148.2 253.6 261.6 203.6 242.J 163.6 
443.8 6.51.0 602-3 556.6 523.9 526.3 
,,,n .-,,,~, 
515.1 1.561.J /,6,IJJ l.6&6J /.,691.1 J.7/6.9 
332.3 850.4 1,013.5 1,049.9 999 • .S J .074.l 
18.4 336.l 283.6 265.6 271.l 174.4 
0.3 1.0 6.9 7.0 7.1 6.4 
28.9 58.2 47.3 41.4 44.6 57.4 
2.1 4.1 6.1 4.7 4.3 12.3 
3.S 7.3 4.5 5.5 7.4 9 . .5 
9.7 40.3 II.I 2.3 42.9 0.3 
70.2 172.8 199.8 236.9 252.6 305.2 
3.3 8.0 7.7 6.5 9.7 29.2 
39.2 72.5 48.! 40. 7 26.6 42.7 
2.9 3.4 5.7 9.4 10.J 9.0 
4.3 7.4 7.6 16.4 1-i.O 3.3 
40.9 81.J J}J.D /4&.1 160.J II /1) 
13.9 19.0 25.3 32.3 45.4 ' 
10.7 18.8 s 1.2 s-4.0 427 33.7 
.5.7 6.1 4.9 7.1 .S.6 
-
1.9 3 . .5 30..5 3.J 12.9 ' 
3.3 3.9 4.0 J.O 1.0 ' 
S.2 30.6 36.6 4.5.1 47.8 75.! 
0.2 0.9 2.5 3.2 .5.1 1..5 
T"hnu,and dunam, 
1977171 
. :-. I I j c·;;,,;,o 
-. - • 1 ·-- I , . .,,," "'""" 0y;,0 c.....,,;-r ;~lt'n Crop cr~:,•.,ci, 'c..,nic ~ -~ ~ ~ ~m it> • 
Non I °'"'" 
"1 F i "'"''I "'""I"""' 1969/701 Jewish Jewish .fl i o ~- Toul I 
farms . farmsi 
Summer c.r op 1 ... , • 1 
Unirrigaced ~ 101al 35.7 II.A 57.9 148.1 153.6 261 .6 103.6 ULJ 16).6 ! ' 
Sorghum for 1.0 2.0 4.2 4.8 12.0 12.3 21.0 62 .9 31.6 
grain . 
-
Maize 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.7 o.s 0.5 I.I 1.4 0.7 
Cotton 1.0 7.7 4.5.l 119.2 173.0 141.8 87.3 94.1 39.8 
Tobacco 10.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.8 Jj.l 9.2 8.9 28.6 
Sunflowers 20.3 1.9 7.7 18.1 48.0 82.2 73.6 62.0 28.8 
Sesame 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 1.8 2.1 2.8 9.2 
Hay 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.7 l.l 3.8 1.7 
~ 
Green fodder 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3. 0.4 0.9 3.0 1.0 1.8 
Silage 0.0 0.0 0.9 4.9 5.8 5.1 4.0 s.o 1.2 
Miscellaneous 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.3 1.2 1.2 0.4 20.2 
Irrigated !. 1u1a/ 10.7 37.9 158.6 441.8 651.0 6013 556.6 513.9 516J 
Sorghum for 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.3 2.4 II.I 11.0 
&rain 
Maiu• I 0.0 1.9 4.7 16.8 23.4 22.1 24.2 14.5 7. 7 Conon I 0.3 19.4 84 .8 379.3 483.8 409.4 346 .8 308.1 ]09 . .5 
Groundnuts 110.4 12.7 18.9 13.4 55.4 62.6 60.8 55 .9 53.3 
Sunflowers 0.0 0 0.6 0. 1 0 .7 .5.0 3.6 0.3 3.6 
Ha)' 0.0 o.s 7.8 5. 7 KO 12.2 16.6 23.6 14.6 
Green fodder 0.0 2.2 36.9 12.4 5 I.S 68.9 86 . .5 8.3.7 I 10.2 
Silage 0.0 o.s 4.6 1.5. i 20.8 18.3 J4.8 16.4 11.7 
Miscenancous 0.0 0. 1 0.3 0.0 0.4 2.S 0.9 0.J 4.7 
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.---· WATER CONSUMPTION IN AGRICULTURE 
Million cubic meters . 
- -, -
... 
a~W?> '"1Dn ,n,p.,, 
l,m,. a,n n~ru Crr-n:, ~m> n11pD1m,a rm,~ 
~:)ff,., M'-,811 am• Pl&b poada Orcharda Vepcabla_ PWdc:rope , Total J)Otaloel melOCII (lDcl. dtnal) 
&Dd pumpk.lm 
1948/49 7 62 108 35 45 ·:2n 
1949/.50 13 92 114 58 55 · 3Jl I 1950151 • 20 113 119 7.5 86 413 19.5 l/S2 23 125 127 100 93 465 1952/.S) 21 146 139 12.S 126 563 l953/S4 37 154 180 131 158 660 
19.54/.B 44 163 216 I 18 219 760 l9S.S/S6 47 17.5 248 12.5 23.S 8'3t 19.56/57 4.5 170 2.50 104 261 ne· 19.57/58 55 l8S 315 130 3 15 1.-
· 1958/59 50 180 325 118 3'11 99G 19"i9/60 .52 183 370 120 33.S l.060 
1960/ 61 .52 168 36.5 10.5 3).5 l,025 
1961/62 60 180 40.5 110 370 1,125 , , 1962/63 60 170 420 111 379 1,14G 1963/64 ss 160 41.5 8.5 310 1,llS 
1964/6.5 ss 160 440 90 3S0 l,19S . l9fiS/66 60 160 SIS Jh) 420 1.265 
1966/67 55 ISO 4S.S 100 3SS I.HS 1967/68 60 1.50 
.52.5 120 410 l.J6S 1968/69 60 14S 
.50.S 120 40.S 
.... 
l.l.15 . t · 
1909/70 6.5 ISO 
.52.5 130 470 1.J41 1970/71 60 145 49() 125 42.S 1,.245 
1971/72 60 ISO 490 130 445 U7S ·, I 972/7 3 60 14.S 
.50.5 , 130 4.5.S l.l9S 1973/74 60 140 460 120 380 1.160 
1974/7.5 60 130 48.5 120 435 1.JJO 197.5/76 6S 130 S4S 120 46.S 1,3lS 
1976/77 70 130 
.500 120 480 Ult 
1 
.A.alllarr tarma, •WMri•, aoww., etc. 
LIVESTOCK 
?v.-J 
-.,-r.,~K~ 
Non- Jcwiab ( a r IJ\ I ,,~ . 
Jcwisb 
farm, 
1977/78 I Q'77/7!! ! I 9 76/77 l 197.5 176 11')74 75,19(, 9.'iO 11959 . 60 11949/ ~0II IJ4714M 
-
.,. 
CATTLE llJ,000 ll9,1SO lll,UO 286,400 205,650 US,450 47,135 JJ,SIO 
Dairy cattle 
Co w~ i03,700 106.200 104.400 10 1.900 82.000 63.100 2.5.64.5 l9 .06S 
Heifer~ ' 19 • .SOO • 82.000 SS.000 8.5,JOO R7.0Sfl 62.000 63 ,700, 21 . .300 14.ISS 
. and calves 
Bullv 200 ISO ISO ISO 150 200 380 360 
Beef cattle '- 97,100 97,800 97,300 '18.300 61.SOO .58.4.50 410 
POULTRY 
(thousands) 
Layin& hens 2.50 9,200 9.200 7.700 8.200 6,800 7,500 2,912 1.426 ; 
Broilers 17.000 IS ,500 13.900 14.900 
Turkeys. 0 .5,.500 .s.soo 4 . .500 5.300 1,800 800 1.5 21 
geese and ducks 
SHEEP 
& GOATS 
Sheep 150.000 I0S,000 107,000 104,200 103.000 113 • .500 117,000 37.000 22 .000 
Goats. improved 12.000 13.000 15.000 14,.SOO 14 • .500 22,000 32.000 1.5.000 4,900 
breed 
Goats. local 120.000 
BEEHIVES 1 !00 60,000 SS,000 ss,ooo SS,000 52,000 47,000 29,000 21.000 
1 HoU' .. la-alf. 
2 Bzcep& prfmitiw bJ.._ 
le···~ ·. ,., 
.~. 
..... 
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